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REGULATING CONTRACT FORMATION: PRECONTRACTUAL RELIANCE, SUNK
COSTS, AND MARKET STRUCTURE
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose four firms compete in a sealed-bid auction for a construction project. Each firm
must spend $25,000 to prepare its bid. The expected cost of performance is one million
dollars. If “sunk costs” do not matter, competition between the firms dictates that the
winning bid should not exceed one million dollars. If so, how do the firms recover their
pre-contractual costs? This puzzle seems of purely economic interest. However, we
suggest that plausible solutions of this puzzle poses a fundamental challenge to one of
the cornerstones of economic analysis of contract law—the problem of underinvestment in precontractual reliance.
It is a well-known fact that negotiation is costly. Negotiating parties are required not
only to invest their time and efforts (which means foregoing other opportunities) but
also to pay for information, expert opinions, financial guaranties, and, last but not least,
lawyers’ fees. Furthermore, in certain cases, submitting the best bid requires preliminary
steps toward performance of the yet-to-be-agreed-upon contract (e.g., receiving offers
from sub-contractors or preparing preliminary plans).1 Such expenditures, so-called
“precontractual reliance” (henceforth: PCR), are usually (at least to some degree)
relationship-specific, in the sense that they cannot be wholly recovered if the
negotiation fails. A party who invests in expenditures that cannot be recovered cannot
credibly threaten ex-post to withdraw from the negotiation because of such “sunk
costs.” For this reason, a negotiating party who does not possess ultimate bargaining
power cannot expect to enjoy the full benefits of her investment in PCR. In some cases,
the investing party might even be pressed to agree to a price that does not cover her precontractual “sunk costs” (i.e., a “holdup problem” is created2). Assuming that a party’s
decision ex-ante is based on her prospects of receiving the surplus generated by her
investment, under-investment in PCR seems inevitable.3
This prediction has led to two arguments. First, parties are expected to account for
the concern of under-investment in PCR through appropriate contractual provisions,
such as termination fees, option contracts, irrevocable offers, and so forth. Second,
contract law should be construed to facilitate optimal investment in PCR. The latter
argument has become increasingly popular in legal scholarship, especially within the
school of economic analysis of contract law. It serves to justify, on an efficiency basis,
1

Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Omri Ben-Shahar, Precontractual Reliance, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 423 (2001)
(accentuating the role of precontractual reliance expenditures as “investments [that] increase the value of
the completed transaction.”).

2

In the legal jargon, the term “contractual holdup” sometimes refers to “situations in which a party accedes
to a very disadvantageous demand due to the party’s being in a circumstance of substantial need:” Steven
Shavell, Contracts, Holdup, and Legal Intervention, HARVARD LAW AND ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPER
No. 508 (2005). Following the economic literature, we use a broader meaning of the term “holdup
problem” here, as explained in the text. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, Hold-Up Problem, in 2 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 241 (Peter K. Newman ed., 1998).

3

See infra Part II.
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imposing “pre-contractual liability”4 and contractual liability without consent.5 It plays
an important role in evaluating other contract law doctrines as well, such as disclosure
rules,6 remedies for breach,7 and the legitimacy of contractual “modification bans.”8
However, despite the overwhelming consensus in law and economics circles that
something must be done in order to resolve the serious problem of under-investment in
PCR, both legislators and practitioners remain unmoved. By and large, positive law
remains inactive in the pre-contractual stage and imposes liability only on limited
grounds.9 Moreover, commercial parties do not seem to be displeased about the law’s
passivity, and, to the best of our knowledge, generally avoid contracting around it.10 For
4

Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 1; Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of
Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L. J. 1249 (1996); G. Richard Shell,
Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial Contracts: Toward a New Cause of Action, 44
VAND L. REV. 221 (1991); Wouter P.J. Wils, Who Should Bear the Costs of Failed Negotiations? A
Functional Inquiry into Precontractual Liability, 4 JOURNAL DES ECONOMISTES ET DES ETUDES
HUMAINES 93 (1993); Juliet P. Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, Moral Hazard, and Sunk Costs:
A Default Rule for Precontractual Negotiations, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 621 (1993); Juliet P. Kostritsky, When
Should Contract Law Supply a Liability Rule or Term?: Framing a Principle of Unification for Contracts,
32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1283 (2000) (the doctrine of promissory estoppel accounts for “the moral hazard
problem endemic to precontractual negotiation, and the central problem of opportunism posed by the
promisee's reliance on sunk costs.”); Jason Scott Johnston, Communication and Courtship: Cheap Talk
Economics and the Law of Contract Formation, 85 VA. L. REV. 385 (1999). See infra Part II.B.1.

5

Omri Ben-Shahar, Contracts Without Consent: Exploring a New Basis For Contractual Liability, 152 U.
PEN. L. REV. 1829 (2004); Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV.
481 (1996); Katz, supra note 4. See infra Part II.B.2.

6

Antony Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure of Information and the Law of Contract, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1978). See infra Part II.B.3.

7

Richard Craswell, Instrumental Theories of Compensation: A Survey, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1135, 1163
(2003) (“In many cases… the only sanction against inefficient precontractual behavior comes in the form
of damages for breach, when the contract that was unwisely entered ends up broken. In these cases, the
selection of the remedy for breach may well have an effect on the incentives for precontractual
behavior”); Richard Craswell, Precontractual Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Problem, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 401 (1988) (addressing the effect of various damage measures on the parties’ incentives to
gather information prior to contracting); Peter A. Diamond & Eric Maskin, An Equilibrium Analysis of
Search and Breach of Contract, I: Steady States, 10 BELL J. ECON. 282 (1979); Peter A. Diamond & Eric
Maskin, An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract II. A Non-Steady State Example, 25 J.
ECON. THEORY 165 (1981).

8

Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541,
611 (2003) (“Modification bans can enable parties to induce efficient relation-specific investment”); Alan
Schwartz & Joel Watson, The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 2 (2004);
Patrick W. Schmitz, Should contractual clauses that forbid renegotiation always be enforced? 21 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 315-329 (2005); Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective
on Contract Modification, 26 J. LEGAL. STUD. 203 (1997); Jason Scott Johnston, Default
Rules/Mandatory Principles: a Game Theoretic Analysis of Good Faith and the Contract Modification
Problem, 3 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 337 (1993) (contract law should prevent “the classic contract
modification holdup game,” which happens because the remedy for breach of contract is not fully
compensatory).

9

See infra Part III.

10

For a similar assessment see, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three
Decades: Success or Failure, 112 YALE L. J. 829, 851-853 (2003) (“…the parties could enter a contract at
the beginning of their relationship, one that specified what the promisee must invest and how the promisee
will be evaluated. As far as I know, parties do not enter such contracts…”). See infra Part III.
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instance, firms do submit bids and invest considerable amounts in PCR, even though
auctioneers almost never promise to reimburse the bidders for their PCR.
One possible explanation for the law’s passivity is that although the level of PCR is
sub-optimal, no plausible wide-ranging legal solution exists that can fix it at reasonable
costs.11 Another possible reason concerns non-legal mechanisms that effectively deal
with opportunism.12 Others question the plausibility of the assumption that parties
disregard “sunk costs,” and thus cannot credibly threaten to withdraw from the
negotiations if they are not compensated for their investment, given ample evidence of
“sunk cost bias.”13 We suggest an alternative explanation, which challenges the
plausibility of the prospect of under-investment in PCR even when all parties are
rational wealth maximizers, who disregard “sunk costs.”
We argue that the shortcoming of the existing literature to reflect both legal and
commercial realities is due to its implied assumption that the bargaining process is a
discrete and isolated interaction between two parties. Negotiations are usually
conducted within (or in the shadow of) a market in which competing suppliers and
purchasers operate. Extending the analytical framework to include competition reveals
that a party is motivated to invest in PCR not only based on her expectation to extract
the benefits that the investment yields (henceforth: Added-Value Motivation). A
negotiating party may well have an incentive to invest in PCR through the effect of the

11

Posner, ibid (Suggesting that parties do not create legal liability for PCR because they mistrust the Courts’
ability to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate reasons for contractual breakdown).

12

The seminal work in this context is Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963) (preservation of business relationships rather than legal
doctrine is the predominant factor in the behavior of business people). See also, e.g., Ronald J. Mann,
Contracts—Only with Consent, 152 U. PEN. L. REV. 1873, 1880-1881 (2004) (“The parties to contracts
that involve ongoing relationships have many privately designed mechanisms for dealing with
opportunism.”); Hideshi Itoh & Hodaka Morita, Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Holdup
Problem, WORKING PAPER (2004) (arguing that there are cases in which not writing a formal contract but
entirely relying on a relational contract increases the total surplus of the buyer and the seller); Lisa
Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Business Norms, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 1765, 1789 (1996) (Arguing that in some markets “nonlegal sanctions such as reputation
bonds are strong enough… making a legally enforceable provision unnecessary.”); David Charny,
Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373 (1990) (“In many
circumstances, the parties will rationally choose to leave a commitment to enforcement solely by nonlegal
sanctions. In these cases, the law should not enforce the promise even though the promisor anticipated,
and indeed desired, reliance by the promise.”).

13

For the tendency to (irrationally) account for sunk costs, see, e.g., Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The
Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 124 (1985);
Oswald Huber & Gabriele Seiser, Accounting and Convincing: The Effect of Two Types of Justification on
the Decision Process, 14 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 69, 70 (2001) (continuous commitment to the
sunk cost effect even when decision makers have to justify their choice); Itamar Simonson & Peter Nye,
The Effect of Accountability on Susceptibility to Decision Errors, 51 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 416, 440 (1992) (accountability did not reduce irrational reliance on sunk costs);
Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Sandeep Baliga, and David A. Besanko, The Sunk Cost Bias and Managerial Pricing
Practices, WORKING PAPER (2005) (firms experiment with cost methodologies that are consistent with
real-world accounting practices, and as a result, the sunk cost bias is expected to persist among all
competing firms).
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investment on her position vis-à-vis her competitors (henceforth: Competition-Based
Motivation).14
The magnitude of the Competition-Based Motivation to invest derives from the
investing party's expected gain from obtaining the contract. The size of this surplus is a
feature of market structure. We demonstrate that under plausible assumptions, when a
party operates in a relatively competitive market, the Competition-Based Motivation is
frequently sufficient to induce optimal PCR, even without appropriate contractual
provisions or legal intervention.
Accounting for the Competition-Based Motivation not only serves to demonstrate
that the alleged problem of under-investment in PCR may not materialize, but also
reveals that in certain contexts the actual concern pertains to excessive PCR. According
to our analysis, a party may well have an incentive to induce his counterpart to overinvest, and legal intervention should be—and, to a considerable extent, is—aimed at
deterring rather than encouraging such activities. Consider, for instance, the famous
case of Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores,15 in which the Court awarded the plaintiff, a wouldbe franchisee, damages equal to the irrevocable part of his PCR, after the negotiations
failed. Existing law and economics literature justifies this result by describing the
circumstances as reflecting a potential holdup problem. According to this reasoning,
Red Owl tried to opportunistically raise the capital it required from Hoffman—a
demand that resulted in the breakdown of the negotiations—based on its assessment that
Hoffman would be forced to accept the new terms, after his investment in PCR was
already “sunk.” Arguably, anticipating such a prospect, future Hoffmans would underinvest, and the legal intervention is aimed at rectifying this inefficiency.16 We challenge
this reasoning. Assuming that would-be franchisees such as Hoffman compete with
other potential candidates, the market mechanism is sufficient to induce players in
Hoffman’s position to invest in PCR even without legal protection. We suggest that the
Court’s decision is nevertheless justified based on the concern of over-investment in
PCR. Imposing Red Owl to bear these costs aims to cause it to internalize the risk of
unwarranted investment, which thereby motivates Red Owl to prevent over-investment
in PCR by would-be franchisees such as Hoffman.
Based on the detailed economic analysis of the parties’ incentives given the
Competition-Based Motivation, we suggest several normative implications. First, legal
intervention that is aimed at encouraging PCR is generally unwarranted when the
investing party operates in a relatively competitive market. The forces of competition
provide adequate investment incentives, and the regulation of contract formation should
14

15
16

Jason Scott Johnston makes the following observation: “My impression is that the reason why business
people incur substantial reliance expenses before they have reached agreement is not because they are
naive about contract law and think that they really do have a legally enforceable agreement, but because
they know that they do not yet have a deal and are fearful that the other party will soon do the deal with
someone else.” Jason Scott Johnston, Investment, Information, and Promissory Liability, 152 U. PEN. L.
REV. 1923, 1937-1938 (2004). We think this observation is right on the money.
133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965). For an extensive discussion of this case see infra part VII.B.3.
Bebchuk and Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, p. 404; Katz, supra note 4, p. 1255; Kostritsky, supra note 4, p.
640; Kostritsky, supra note 4, p. 1323. See also Johnston, supra note 4, pp. 1934-1935 (“Economic
analysts of contract law came to view Hoffman as exemplifying the… specter of inefficient underreliance.”).

Page 5 of 49

REGULATING CONTRACT FORMATION

only facilitate their operation. We thus justify the reluctance to impose precontractual
liability in cases of failed negotiations.
Second, the analysis demonstrates that when one party (e.g., the supplier) operates
in a competitive market of “professional” repeating players, the other party (e.g., the
purchaser) is better off limiting the number of bidders (suppliers) with whom he
negotiates. This result suggests that in such cases, from an efficiency perspective, a
party (including a public authority) should be allowed to limit the number of suppliers
with whom he conducts negotiations. By contrast, when suppliers operate in a
competitive market of accidental, one-time players, the purchaser has an interest in
encouraging excessive entry of suppliers into the negotiations, and legal intervention
aimed at regulating the purchaser’s behavior can be justified. This result may justify, for
instance, imposing a duty on employers to pay for training periods of potential
employees.
Third, legal intervention is justified to prevent manipulating a bidder’s assessment
of her likelihood of success in winning the contract. The analysis supports a rule that
prohibits an auctioneer from receiving an offer that was submitted outside of the
auction’s procedures, and a rule that disallows changing “the rules of the game” after
the bidders already invested in PCR.
Fourth, we show that when legal intervention is justified in the negotiation stage,
the appropriate measure of damages that should be awarded is the plaintiff’s expectation
interest. We also demonstrate that the difficulty in assessing this value when a contract
is not formed can be resolved by approximating this value according to the sum of PCR
for all bidders.
Finally, we offer a new rationale for imposing disclosure duties (as well as other
mandatory requirements to invest in PCR). We show that, in certain cases, such
investment is allocated to the party who operates in a competitive market, even if it is
efficient for the other party to bear this cost. Legal intervention is essential in such cases
to resolve this inefficiency in the allocation of PCR. We refer in this respect to the case
of Laidlaw v. Organ,17 and demonstrate why, contrary to the common wisdom,
imposing a duty to disclose information is not expected to adversely affect a party’s
incentive to invest in acquiring information.
Our goals in this paper are threefold: First, we explain the complicated
relationships between competitive market structures and the level of investment in PCR.
We aim to demonstrate that the literature’s harsh predictions of underinvestment in PCR
are improbable within competitive markets. To the contrary, in certain cases the concern
should be exactly the opposite: overinvestment in PCR. Second, we derive normative
conclusions from the economic analysis. Third, we use theoretical insights to explain
and criticize well-known court decisions concerning precontractual liability.
The paper is organized as follows. Part II portrays the common wisdom as to PCR
within the law and economics literature, and its policy implications. Part III produces
evidence of the puzzle that we aim to address: the discrepancy between the literature's
predictions and both legal and commercial realities. Part IV presents the basic
arguments, by distinguishing between the Added-Value Motivation and the
17

15 U.S. 178 (2 Wheat) (1817).
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Competition-Based Motivation. Part V outlines the framework of the analysis that
follows. Parts VI and VII are devoted to a detailed economic analysis of the expected
outcomes in two types of competitive markets—that of “professional” repeating players
(henceforth: Repeating Players Markets) and that of accidental, one-time players
(henceforth: One-Time Players Markets). We also suggest several normative
implications based on the economic analysis. Part VIII concludes with remarks as to the
importance of market analysis to the proper structuring of legal intervention.
II. THE COMMON WISDOM: THE PREDICTION OF UNDER-INVESTMENT IN
PCR AND ITS LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
Inducing optimal, surplus-maximizing investment in reliance is a central theme of
economic analysis of contract law.18 Assuming both parties are rational wealthmaximizers, the typical discussion starts with an assessment of the expected outcome of
the presumably non-cooperative interaction between the parties.19 Whenever
inefficiency is predicted, the way is paved for a search for sophisticated contractual
provisions and for creatively construing legal doctrines aimed at facilitating surplus
maximization. In the context of PCR, there is almost a consensus within economicallyoriented scholarship regarding the first phase, whereby non-cooperative bargaining is
expected to result in under-investment in PCR. Thus, most discussion is usually devoted
to the second phase—searching for solutions to this inefficiency. However, as indicated
above, we challenge the plausibility of the first phase. We claim that the risk of underinvestment in PCR is rather limited, and thus avoid evaluating the suggested solutions
for that problem. Nevertheless, we briefly present some of these solutions, in order to
demonstrate the importance of the subject in the prevailing academic discourse.
A. The Premise of Under-Investment in PCR
The common wisdom is that the parties’ incentives to invest in PCR are deficient
because of the so-called “holdup problem.” This prediction draws heavily on insights
that were developed in the context of post-contractual relation-specific investment in
incomplete contracts.20 The argument is based on the characterization of PCR as
18

Schwartz and Scott, supra note 8, p. 545 (“Contract law should attempt to facilitate efficient trade and
investment”); Daniel A. Farber and John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and
the “Invisible Handshake,” 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 928-9 (1985) (Contract law should serve not to
compensate detrimental reliance in individual cases, but rather to foster trust as a public good.).

19

Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract
Formation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 215 (1990) (emphasizing the importance of strategic behavior in construing
the contract law of formation).

20

The seminal works in this field are OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTI-TRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance
of Contractual Relations, 22 J. L. & ECON. 233 (1979); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs
and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986);
Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990).
For an illuminating non-technical exposition see Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory
of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (1989). For a discussion of the connection between this literature
and the prediction of under-investment in PCR, see Shell, supra note 4, pp. 227-232; Katz, supra note 4,
pp. 1278-1281; Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, p. 424.

Page 7 of 49

REGULATING CONTRACT FORMATION

creating positive externality: “The investing party bears the entire cost of the investment
but enjoys only a fraction of its benefit.”21
The predicted under-investment derives from a three-step argument:
Step 1 An investment in PCR is typically relationship-specific, such that it
cannot be fully recovered once it has been made, even if the contract
is not formed. Examples are investments in acquiring relationshipspecific information; legal fees; the costs of financial guaranties; and
opportunity costs.
Step 2 Unrecoverable expenditures, so-called “sunk costs,” are essentially
irrelevant for any ongoing decisions by the negotiating parties.22
Assuming all negotiating parties are rational, a party who invested in
PCR cannot credibly threaten to withdraw from the negotiations if she
does not enjoy the full benefits generated by her PCR.23 The parties
will therefore split the contractual surplus according to their relative
bargaining power when they come to conclude the deal. As a result, if
a party does not possess ultimate bargaining power, she cannot expect
to enjoy the full benefits of her investment in PCR. Moreover, she
might even be pressed to agree to a price that does not cover her precontractual “sunk costs.”24
Step 3 It is implicitly assumed that a party’s exclusive incentive to invest in
PCR is what we term Added-Value Motivation. Under this
assumption, a party’s decision whether to invest in PCR is based on
her evaluation of the fraction of the surplus generated by this
investment that she expects to receive under the contract. By the
premises of Steps 1 and 2, a party who invests in PCR cannot usually
21

Ben-Shahar, supra note 5, p. 1848.

22

In this sense, “sunk costs” are distinguished from “fixed costs:” Whereas the former costs cannot be
recovered and are thus irrelevant for ongoing decisions, the latter can be eliminated in cases of no
performance, and are thus an ongoing expenditure. ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD,
MICROECONOMICS (6th ed., Prentice Hall, 2005) chapter 7.

23

We do not address here the plausibility of this premise of “rationality.” See supra note 13.

24

Katz, supra note 4, p. 1278 (“Investing in a relationship-specific asset makes the investor vulnerable to
opportunistic behavior after the fact. Because the asset is worth little outside the specific relationship, the
party with the bulk of the bargaining power can appropriate its value; the party without bargaining power
has nowhere else to go. For this reason, he or she may wind up no better off for having made the
investment and, in the event that the relationship dissolves, will be worse off”); Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar,
supra note 1, p. 431; Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Law and Economics of Preliminary
Agreements, WORKING PAPER (2005). Craswell argues that the holdup problem is caused because of the
ability of the non-relying party to withdraw from the negotiation without cost: Crasswell, supra note 5, p.
492. See also Rick Smith, Here’s Why Hollywood Should Kiss the Handshake Deal Goodbye, 23 LOY.
L.A. ENT. L. REV. 503, 519 (2003) (“The risk is that, after making expenditures in reliance upon the
future agreement, the other party may walk away from negotiations without having incurred any cost,
leaving the party that made the expenditures at a loss”). Yet, it is hard to see why the relying party has a
less credible threat than the non-relying party that they would waive a beneficial contract. Therefore, the
better argument for the existence of a holdup problem seems to be that if a contract is attained, the
benefits from PCR will be divided according to the parties’ relative bargaining power and not according
to each party’s contribution.
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expect to reap the full benefit of her investment. The gap between the
investing party’s private gains from PCR (the fraction that she obtains
from the PCR’s added value) and the party's “social” gains (i.e., the
PCR’s full added value) results in an ex-ante under-investment in
PCR.
The following example demonstrates this argument.
Example 1: Boaz, a landowner, is interested in renovating his house. He
considers hiring Ruth as the contractor who will perform the construction works.
The value of the construction works for Boaz is $1,000, and Ruth can perform
them at a cost of $600. Assume that Ruth can increase Boaz’s valuation of her
work by $200, by investing $120 in PCR. Assuming there is no uncertainty
regarding the formation of the contract, this PCR is efficient from a social
perspective. Yet, assuming an equal split of the contractual surplus, Ruth is better
off avoiding the investment: She bears a cost of $120 which yields her a private
benefit of only $100 (one-half of the contractual surplus that is generated by the
investment).
As indicated above, this prediction of under-investment in PCR is widely accepted
in the economic-oriented legal literature.25 Before we move on to challenge this
prediction, we briefly present the central role of this prediction in both positive and
normative analysis of the law of contract formation.
B. The Role of Contract Law in Inducing Optimal Reliance
Once the problem of under-investment in PCR has been identified, the next logical step
is to encourage contracting parties and lawmakers to take this holdup problem into
account, and to develop sophisticated mechanisms in order to prevent under-investment
in the precontractual stage. One group of solutions, which has been developed in the
economic literature on the theory of contracts, aims to set appropriate contractual
25

Omri Ben-Shahar, “Agreeing to Disagree”: Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, 2004
WIS. L. REV. 389, 406-407 (2004) (“In the absence of some kind of commitment, parties will apply
greater caution and expend less in precontractual reliance, in fear that such investment might be wasted if
the other party walks away, or that reliance will make them vulnerable to holdup by the other party.”);
Bebchuk and Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, pp. 431-432 (“Under a regime of no precontractual liability, each
party will underinvest in reliance.”); Katz, supra note 4; Craswell, supra note 5; Anthony J. Bellia Jr.,
Contracting With Electronic Agents, 50 EMORY L.J. 1047, 1083 (2001) (“Recent scholarship suggests that
imposing no liability for precontracutal reliance… may lead to inefficient outcomes.”); Edward T.
Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2061, 2074 (2003) (“Where parties are free to exit a relationship…
they will under-invest in reliance. … In the treaty context… States may decide not to negotiate at all
[and] may simply wait to ratify, perhaps mutually deterring one another’s ratification.”); Craswell, supra
note 7, p. 1165 (“If I decide to spend extra time searching for a better deal, I will capture some of the
benefits of that search myself… . However, I will not necessarily capture all of the benefits from further
search, because some of those benefits will likely be gained by the buyer that I eventually sell my widget
to… As a result…[I may have] too little incentive for additional search.”); Shell, supra note 4; Kostritsky,
supra note 4; Juliet P. Kostritsky, Reshaping the Precontractual Liability Debate: Beyond Short Run
Economics, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 325 (1997); Schwartz and Scott, supra note 24 (“If the project turns out
to be profitable, so the parties renegotiate to set a price, the faithful party’s sunk costs will be ignored in
the bargain while the unfaithful party will be compensated for costs it must incur to make the project
successful. As usual, the main inefficiency is ex ante: A party who anticipates strategic behavior will not
play, and potentially efficient projects will be foregone.”).
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provisions. For instance, a party can induce the other party to invest in PCR by
promising to reimburse her expenditures (termination fees26), by entering into a
preliminary (possibly optional) contract,27 and via several other mechanisms.28
The holdup problem can also be addressed through various legal solutions. We
briefly describe three main types of legal solutions that were suggested by the literature.
1. Reimbursement (Precontractual Liability)
A first line of inquiry is focused on imposing “precontractual” liability on a bargaining
party, to reimburse the investing party for the latter’s PCR if the negotiations fail. Such
a rule makes the PCR relevant for the parties’ ongoing decisions during bargaining and
can thus solve the holdup problem. Applying such a solution requires the Court to
assess the parties’ bargaining practices, in order to insure that it does not induce overinvestment. Optimal reliance investment can be achieved by assigning liability only to a
party who “bargains in an ex-post opportunistic manner,” i.e., who takes advantage of
the “sunk” nature of the other party’s expenditure.29 Based on these insights, Lucian
26

Judd F. Sneirson, Merger Agreements, Termination Fees, and the Contract-Corporate Tension, 2002
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 573, 578 (“To guard against [the] risk of non-consummation, and to protect their
interests in the event this risk is realized, potential acquirors insert various deal-protective provisions into
merger agreements. These measures can, for example, reimburse would-be acquirors for their expenses
and lost profits should another bidder emerge and prevail in a bidding contest”); Brazen v. Bell Atlantic
Corp., 695 A.2d 43 (Del. 1997) (assessing the validity of a merger agreement’s reciprocal termination fee
provision according to contract law’s standard for liquidated damages provisions); Thomas A. Swett,
Comment, Merger Terminations After Bell Atlantic: Applying a Liquidated Damages Analysis to
Termination Fee Provisions, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 341 (1999); Edith S. Hotchkiss, Jun Qian & Weihong
Song, Holdups, Renegotiation, and Deal Protection in Mergers, DISCUSSION PAPER (2005) (“A properly
designed initial contract [can] solve the holdup problem during renegotiation and induces higher dealspecific effort that increases expected payoffs from the merger. The contract grants an option to the target
to terminate the merger, while the strike on the option compensates the acquirer’s effort without imposing
excessive costs on the target for pursuing non-merger alternatives.”).

27

Aaron S. Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment, 86
AM. ECON. REV. 478 (1996) (Signing a non-contingent contract prior to investing can induce optimal
precontractual investment).

28

Yeon-Koo Che and József Sákovics, A Dynamic Theory of Holdup, 72 ECONOMETRICA 1063 (2004)
(When the parties continue to invest until they agree on the terms of trade, the holdup problem need not
entail under-investment if the parties are sufficiently patient); Vladimir Smirnov & Andrew Wait, Holdup and Sequential Specific Investments, 35 RAND J. ECON. 386 (2004) (When both parties can make
investments either simultaneously or sequentially, as the number of potential investment periods is
increased, the subgame-perfect equilibrium can switch between a prisoners' dilemma and a coordination
game).

29

Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, p. 437. See, e.g., Venture Associates Corporation v. Zenith Data
Systems Corporation, 96 F.3d 275, 279-280 (7th Cir. App. 1996) (C.J. Posner) (“[The seller] was free to
demand as high a price as it thought the market would bear, provided that it was not trying to scuttle the
deal… or to take advantage of costs sunk by [the purchaser] in the negotiating process.”). See also George
M. Cohen, The Future of Law and Economics: The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law,
20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 941 (1992) (arguing that contract law should place a presumptive priority on curbing
potentially opportunistic behavior, at the expense of not preventing potentially negligent behavior); Shell,
supra note 4; Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MIN. L. REV. 521
(1981) (The doctrines of implicit terms of contracts and the duty to act in good faith can serve to deter
opportunistic behavior); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.
LAW AND ECON. 425 (1993) (When contracting is costly, the holdup problem is best resolved by imposing
on the agent a duty of loyalty).
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Bebchuk and Omri Ben-Shahar suggest that “the offeror who revokes the offer [should
be required] to reimburse the offeree for reliance expenditures incurred after the offer
was made.”30 Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott argue that when the parties do agree on
certain terms but not on all relevant terms, such that their agreement is not fully binding,
liability should be imposed in cases where it is efficient to commence a project through
PCR and yet to avoid forming a complete contract.31
Avery Katz points at the valuable point that there is no holdup problem if the party
who holds the bargaining power is also the one who is required to pay for the PCR. The
rationale for this assertion is quite simple: Inasmuch as the party who holds the
bargaining power is the one who is expected to reap all the benefits from PCR, we can
equate private and social incentives by making it the sponsor (and not only the
beneficiary) of the PCR.32 Katz thus argues that instead of enforcing any “preliminary
communication—an offer, an estimate, a tentative prediction of the bargain,” a more
nuanced approach is required: “In situations in which offerors hold the bulk of the
bargaining power, the rule of Restatement (Second) section 87(2) may indeed make
sense.33 By forcing the offeror to bear the costs of precontractual reliance, the law gives
her the incentive to weigh those costs against the benefits she obtains from it. In
situations in which offerees hold the bulk of the bargaining power, however, the
common law rule of free revocability makes more sense, for in that case it is the offeree
who needs the incentives.”34 Bebchuk and Ben-Shahar extend this insight by showing
that splitting the precontractual costs according to the parties’ relative bargaining power
(assuming this is verifiable by the court) provides an efficient solution to the tradeoff
between under-investment and over-investment in PCR.35

30

Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, ibid, p. 449. They also suggest that “it might be desirable to impose some
reliance liability on the party who solicited [an] offer and is now unwilling to contract upon its terms:”
ibid, p. 450. See also Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass, Promissory Fraud Without Breach, 2004 WIS. L. REV.
507 (2004) (A claim of promissory fraud should be recognized even if the promissory did not breach,
when the promissory misrepresented in order to strategically induce reliance and action).

31

Schwartz and Scott, supra note 24. They argue that the goal of inducing efficient investment in PCR
“would be advanced by awarding the faithful party its verifiable reliance costs if the other has wrongfully
delayed investment. There is no need to protect the expectation, which in any event would be hard to do
for projects that never get off the ground.” ibid, p. 38.

32

Katz, supra note 4. For a related argument, see Joseph Farrell & Robert Gibbons, Cheap Talk about
Specific Investments, 11 J. LAW, ECON, & ORG. 313 (1995) (reducing the producer’s ex post bargaining
power may enhance efficiency by providing incentives for the buyer to reveal his private information
before the investment is made).

33

Section 87(2) of the Restatement (Second) Contracts states as follow: “An offer which the offeror should
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a substantial character on the part of the offeree
before acceptance and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding as an option contract to
the extent necessary to avoid injustice.”

34

Katz, supra note 4, p. 1280. Katz adds that “if bargaining power is equally distributed between the parties,
there may be no particular efficiency advantage to either rule”: Ibid, ibid.

35

Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, pp. 438-439.
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2. Contractual Liability Without Consent
The holdup problem may disappear if the parties are held legally bounded before the
investment is made, rather than after it becomes a “sunk cost.” In other words, forcing a
definite division of the surplus from the PCR in advance can prevent a holdup problem
afterward.
Based on this insight Richard Craswell argues that courts are likely to find a binding
commitment of one party when reliance by the other party is efficient. Craswell justifies
this legal practice by the need to provide incentives to efficiently invest in PCR: “The
legal doctrines governing offer and acceptance can be interpreted to prevent one party
from withdrawing in just those cases where an enforceable commitment would have
been necessary to induce an efficient level of reliance by the other party. In those
cases… even the party who now seeks to withdraw would have wanted to be
committed… precisely in order to induce efficient reliance.”36
An insightful argument that builds on similar premises, but suggests a much more
ambitious normative implication, is Omri Ben-Shahar’s recent proposal to replace the
“consent” basis for contractual liability with a “no-retraction” basis for liability.37 Ben
Shahar’s focal point is that in order to encourage efficient reliance throughout the
negotiation stage, the limited maneuvering space allowed by the existing law of contract
formation (which is built on the idea of “consent”) is insufficient. Efficient reliance may
be required in early stages of the negotiation, when no full-blown consensus exists.
Thus, Ben-Shahar suggests assigning a party an option to bind her counterpart to his
representation or to charge him with some liability in case he retracts.38
3. Allowing a Party to Conceal Information
An important type of PCR is that of acquiring information. As far as information that is
relationship-specific is concerned, this investment is a “sunk cost” once it has been
made. As explained above, absent a preliminary agreement, a party who expects to
enjoy only a fraction of the benefit from acquiring information will under-invest in
obtaining it. Allowing a party the right to exploit the information she gathers, by

36

Craswell, supra note 5, p. 484. See also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Revocation of Offers, 2004 WIS. L.
REV. 271; Kostritsky, supra note 25 (Efficiency considerations justify a law-supplied default rule of a
performance obligation that would act as an adjunct to private contractual arrangements). For a criticism
of Craswell’s argument, see Posner, supra note 10, p. 852 (arguing that Craswell does not show that the
outcomes of the cases are themselves efficient).

37

Ben-Shahar, supra note 5.

38

See also Ben-Shahar, supra note 25 (In order to induce optimal PCR, “a party who seeks enforcement of a
deliberately incomplete agreement [should] be granted an option to enforce the transaction under the
agreed-upon terms supplemented with terms that are the most favorable (within reason) to the
defendant.”); Mark K. Johnson, Enforceability of Precontractual Agreements in Illinois: The Need For A
Middle Ground, 68 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 939 (1993) (recommending that the courts accept an intermediate,
flexible regime of enforceable precontractual agreements). For a criticism of Ben-Shahar’s approach see
Johnston, supra note 14, pp. 1936-1939 (arguing that Ben-Shahar’s suggestion creates more reliance
problems than it solves, because it induces “strategic use of early reliance to force parties into inefficient
transactions.”); Mann, supra note 12, pp. 1887-1888 (Ben-Shahar’s model is subject to the problem of
excessive reliance).
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exempting her from an obligation to disclose it to the other party, can solve this
problem.
Antony Kronman offers such reasoning in his seminal paper Mistake, Disclosure of
Information and the Law of Contract.39 Kronman’s main argument is that there is a
tradeoff between the aim of reducing the “transaction costs of the contracting process”
by compelling the “better (cheaper) information-gatherer” to disclose information,40 and
the concern that if the possessor of information “is denied the benefit of having and
using it, he will have an incentive to reduce (or curtail entirely) his production of such
information in the future.”41 Kronman’s by-now-famous proposal to balance this
tradeoff is by compelling disclosure of “casually acquired information” (i.e.,
information whose costs “would have been incurred in any case”) while allowing
holders of “deliberately acquired information” (i.e., “information whose acquisition
entails costs”42) the privilege not to disclose it.43
Kronman’s suggestion to solve the holdup problem is to reduce legal intervention
(i.e., limiting the duty of disclosure) and not to expend it; but as the Realists taught us,
limiting legal intervention is no more “neutral” than extending legal intervention.44
Thus, allowing PCR to remain hidden comprises the same solution whether the law
facilitates it by action (e.g., by giving the buyer an opportunity to privately examine the
goods) or simply permits it by non-intervention (e.g., by sanctioning non-disclosure).
III. THE PUZZLE: THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE LITERATURE’S
PREDICTION AND THE LEGAL AND COMMERCIAL REALITIES
The intensive academic discourse that offered innovative legal solutions to the problem
of under-investment in PCR did not bring about a noticeable change in the law of
contract formation. U.S. law still refrains, as a general matter, from imposing precontractual liability or contractual liability without consent.

39

Kronman, supra note 6.

40

Ibid, pp. 4-5. Kronman implicitly assumes throughout his analysis that the social benefits from new
information are identical to the private benefits that its creator can achieve from a non-disclosure rule.

41

Ibid, pp. 13-14.

42

Ibid, p. 13.

43

See also Steven Shavell, Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale, 25 RAND J. ECON. 20
(1994); Crasswell, supra note 5, p. 494 (“…B’s reliance incentives may also remain undistorted if S
cannot find out what effect B’s reliance has had on the value of the transaction to B. … If S cannot find
out what B’s information revealed, she may not know whether B now believes the transaction to be any
more valuable, and thus may have no reason to try to negotiate a higher price. Here too, an enforceable
commitment would be unnecessary to create an incentive for efficient reliance”); James Gordley, Mistake
in Contract Formation, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 433, 451 (2004) (arguing for a duty of disclosure but agreeing
that “there should be an exception if one of the parties has expended money or effort to acquire the
information.”); Christopher T. Wonnell, The Structure of a General Theory of Nondisclosure, 41 CASE W.
RES. 329 (1992) (pointing at the risk that a legal duty to disclose or refrain from trading would lead the
information holder to refrain rather than disclose). For a review of judicial decisions that followed
Kronman’s thesis, see Nicola W. Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required During Precontractual
Negotiations, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 70, 178-179 (1993).

44

See, e.g., Crasswell, supra note 5, pp. 485-486.
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For instance, Courts are willing to impose precontractual liability only in cases of
unjust enrichment resulting from the negotiations, misrepresentation made during the
negotiations, or a specific promise during the negotiations, but they refuse to recognize
a general obligation arising out of the negotiations themselves.45 The duty to negotiate
in good faith is generally considered as “a (nearly) empty vessel.”46 The doctrine of
promissory estoppels and other forms of imposing contractual liability without consent
are in decline.47 As summarized by Schwartz and Scott, “Courts will not grant recovery
for ‘early reliance’ unless the parties, by agreeing on something significant, have
indicated their intention to be bound,” such that “Courts actually make some form of
agreement a necessary condition to promisee recovery.”48
45

E. Allen Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed
Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 221 (1987) (“A party that enters negotiations in the hope of the
gain that will result from ultimate agreement bears the risk of whatever loss results if the other party
breaks off the negotiations. That loss includes out-of-pocket costs the disappointed party has incurred, any
worsening of its situation, and any opportunities that it has lost as a result of the negotiations. All is
hazarded on a successful outcome of the negotiations; all is lost on failure.”); Randy E. Barnett & Mary E.
Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formalities and Misrepresentations, 15
HOFSTRA L. REV. 443 (1987) (the doctrine of promissory estoppel is aimed at imposing liability to
compensate for harm caused by some misrepresentations).

46

Emily M.S. Houh, The Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law: A (Nearly) Empty Vessel?, 2005 UTAH
L. REV. 1 (2005) (arguing that the duty of good faith is employed as a proxy for material breach, but it
fails to reach forms of contractual bad faith that occur during contract negotiation and formation); STEVEN
J. BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSEN, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH: FORMATION, PERFORMANCE, BREACH,
ENFORCEMENT 330-331 (1995): “American law imposes no general duty to negotiate a contract in good
faith ... [American courts] continue to view contract negotiations as, at bottom, an undertaking in which
self-interest is the accepted norm. Each party assumes the risk that, despite a heavy investment in the
negotiation process, no agreement will be reached.” For a different view see also Melvin A. Eisenberg,
The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1743, 1811-13 (2000) (discussing cases in
which the court imposed a duty to negotiate in good faith). The United Nations Convention on the
International Sale of Goods does not include a provision stipulating that parties must act in good faith
during contract negotiation. As a result, it is not clear whether it is possible to impose precontractual
liability under the Convention. See, e.g., Diane Madeline Goderre, International Negotiations Gone Sour:
Precontractual Liability Under the United Nations Sales Convention, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 257 (1997).

47

E. Allan Farnsworth, Developments in Contract Law During the 1980's: The Top Ten, 41 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 203, 219-20 (1990) (promissory estoppel failed to make headway in overcoming the formal
barriers to contract enforcement); Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the “New Consensus” on Promissory
Estoppel: An Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580, 615-18 (1998) (reporting that
promissory estoppel is seldom successful as a basis for recovery); Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance:
The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1191 (1998) (“1980 may have been the high-water
mark for promissory estopell.”); Phuong N. Pham, Note, The Waning of Promissory Estoppel, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 1263 (1994); Gregory M. Duhl, Red Owl’s Legacy, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 297 (2003)
(Courts have scaled back the scope of the doctrine of promissory estoppel). See also Farber and
Matheson, note 18, p. 945 (Promissory liability is imposed mostly in cases of “bargained-for exchange”
and only rarely “to remedy the injury to promisees who have relied on promises in vain.”). For a different
view, see David V. Snyder, Comparative Law in Action: Promissory Estoppel, The Civil Law, and The
Mixed Jurisdiction, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 695, 700-703 (1998) (Promissory estoppel often
results in awarding expectancy, not only reliance damages).

48

Schwartz and Scott, supra note 24, p. 11. Schwartz and Scott report that in a sample of 140 cases litigated
between 1999 and 2003, absent misrepresentation or deceit, no liability for reliance investments made
during the negotiation process was imposed. Liability was imposed only when the parties had agreed on at
least some material terms, and even then liability was not imposed if the parties had indicated, either
expressly or by implication, that they did not intend to be legally bound: ibid. See also Edward Yorio &
Steven Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111 (1991) (courts are basing liability
mainly on assent rather than reliance).
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Prevailing contract law does not compel—either directly or indirectly—a
negotiating party to enable her counterpart to exclusively extract the benefit generated
by the latter’s PCR, as required in order to solve the holdup problem. As stated in a 7th
Circuit Court decision, “In a business transaction both sides presumably try to get the
best of the deal. That is the essence of bargaining and the free market... So one cannot
characterize self-interest as bad faith. No particular demand in negotiations could be
termed dishonest, even if it seemed outrageous to the other party.”49
Against this legal background, and given the prospect of inefficient underinvestment in PCR, one would expect negotiating parties to employ explicit contractual
provisions aimed at inducing optimal PCR. Indeed, in certain contexts, parties form
“preliminary agreements” (which are enforceable only as far as they are adequately
explicit), aiming at solving the potential deficiencies of the holdup problem.50 One may
also find cases in which reimbursement or “termination fees” are promised if a contract
is not formed.51 However, as a general matter, such practices seem to be the exception
rather than the rule. In many commercial transactions, the parties avoid contracting
around the rule of no precontractual liability, even when substantial PCR is required.52
For instance, auctioneers do not promise to reimburse bidders for their PCR.
Furthermore, “termination fees” are often referred to by the target board as reflecting
“defensive measures” (because the fees make the board’s decision to reject an offer to
purchase the firm costly), rather than surplus-enhancing measures.53
The sharp inconsistency between the harsh predictions of the law and economics
literature described in Part II and the reality of both legal and commercial law described
above is troubling. As indicated above, this discrepancy may be explained by suggesting
that there is no adequate legal solution to the hold-up problem, by referring to non-legal
mechanisms that effectively deal with opportunism, or by pointing at a “sunk cost
bias.”54 We suggest an alternative explanation, which challenges the plausibility of the
prospect of under-investment in PCR.
IV. THE COMPETITION-BASED MOTIVATION TO INVEST IN PCR
As indicated in Part II above, the prospect of under-investment in PCR is based on three
premises: (1) An investment in PCR is typically relationship-specific, such that it cannot
be recovered once it has been made ("sunk costs"); (2) The parties split the contractual
49

Feldman v. Allegheny International, Inc., 850 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1988).

50

Burton & Andersen, supra note 46, pp. 348-49 (arguing that the rule that good faith duties do not pertain
during pre-contract negotiations is sometimes modified by preliminary agreements).

51

Ben-Shahar, supra note 25, p. 407 (“Parties who enter complex and costly negotiations are careful to first
agree on some precontractual arrangements for cost reimbursement in the event that negotiations fail);
Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1, 27 (showing that
firms make irrevocable offers); Johnston, supra note 14, p. 1939 (“Whenever early reliance investment is
valuable, the party making that investment does not actually do so until she gets an agreement allocating
the cost of that investment and insuring her of some return on it.”).

52

Posner, supra note 10, pp. 851-53.

53

Sneirson, supra note 26 (discussing the standard of judicial review of the target board’s decision).

54

See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
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surplus according to their relative bargaining powers at the stage of contract formation.
Thus, a party who invested in PCR enjoys only a fraction of the benefits generated by
her expenditure, and might even be pressed to accept an outcome that does not cover
her "sunk cost;" (3) The deficiency in the parties’ "Added-Value Motivation" leads to
under-investment in PCR.
This grim account is based on an implied, implausible assumption that bargaining is
a discrete and isolated interaction between two parties. In particular, the literature’s
predictions of the bargaining’s outcome and of the parties’ pre-bargaining behavior
disregard the possibility of competition between each of the negotiating parties and
other alternative bargainers who compete with them for the privilege of contracting.55
In the context of post-contractual relation-specific investment, the concern of
underinvestment in an incomplete contract is plausible, considering that once the
contract is formed a contracting party does not have to compete with non-contracting
parties. If so, the Added-Value Motivation is indeed the exclusive factor in inducing a
party to make a relation-specific investment. By contrast, in the pre-contractual phase, a
party usually has to face strong competition. Evidently, negotiations rarely take place in
a commercial vacuum. Negotiations are usually conducted within a market in which a
number of competing suppliers and purchasers operate. In some cases, the competition
is explicit and instantaneous, as in the case of an auction or procurement. In other cases,
the bargaining takes place only in the shadow of competition, as in cases where both
parties are well aware that alternative negotiating parties are waiting to take their place
if negotiations fail. In both cases, competition plays an important role in both directing
the parties’ decisions regarding investment in PCR and shaping the outcome of the
bargaining process.56 As our analysis shows, accounting for markets and competition is
essential in understanding the bargaining mechanism and the parties’ motivation to
incur PCR.
Extending the analytical framework to include competition reveals that a party is
motivated to invest in PCR not only based on her expectation to extract the benefits that
the investment yields (the Added-Value Motivation). A negotiating party may also well
have an incentive to invest in PCR through the effect of that investment on her position
vis-à-vis her competitors (the “Competition-Based Motivation”). A party who faces
competition is expected to consider the impact of PCR on her chances of winning the
contract over the other candidates. In other words, even if the purchaser captures all the
direct profits from PCR if a contract is formed, it may nonetheless be rational for the
supplier to invest in PCR in order to improve her chances of obtaining the contract. For
instance, Boeing cannot expect to be able to extract from its customers all the value that
55

Katz notes in this respect: “In the construction cases, the offeror’s bid comes as the result of a competitive
auction, and the auction process itself may have consequences for efficiency:” Katz, supra note 4, p. 1256
(footnote 23). Katz, however, avoids referring to these consequences. Similarly, Bebchuk and Ben-Shahar
mention the possibility of a solicitation that is addressed simultaneously to a number of invitees, but do
not refer to the possible effect of competition on the offerors’ incentives: Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra
note 1, pp. 450-451.

56

Indeed, the same argument applies to the post-contractual stage, if the costs of replacing the contracting
party (including legal remedies) are sufficiently low. Compare Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur:
The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships, 34 ECON. INQ. 444 (1996) (Hold-ups occur when
market conditions change sufficiently to place the relationship outside the self-enforcing range).
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will be generated from its investment in developing a more efficient aircraft (PCR).
Nevertheless, Boeing is motivated to invest billions of dollars in R&D based on its
assessment that the investment will increase the likelihood that potential customers will
purchase Boeing’s aircrafts rather than those of Airbus. The incentive is a CompetitionBased rather than Added-Value Motivation as far as it relates to the investor’s interest
in the added value from contracting, and not to her interest in the added value generated
by the PCR.57
A simple alteration to Example 1 can demonstrate both the existence of the
Competition-Based Motivation and its difference from the Added-Value Motivation.
Example 2: Assume, as in Example 1, that the landowner Boaz is interested in
renovating his house and is considering hiring the contractor Ruth to do
construction work. Again, the value of the work for Boaz is $1,000, and Ruth can
perform it at a cost of $600. Ruth knows that for an additional investment in PCR
of $120 she can increase Boaz’s valuation of her work by $200. We also assume
an equal split of the contractual surplus. However, here, unlike the previous
example, assume further that Boaz is considering another contractor as well,
Naomi.
Example 1 demonstrates that if we disregard competition, Ruth is clearly better
off avoiding the investment in PCR. However, accounting for Naomi may well
yield a different outcome. If Ruth does not invest in PCR, she would gain $200
(one half of the contractual surplus, $1,000-$600) if she won the contract.
However, Ruth’s chances of obtaining the contract are quite slim because without
PCR, Boaz’s benefits from contracting with her are only $200. By contrast, if
Ruth invests $120 in PCR, her net benefit is reduced to $180 if she wins the
contract (one half of the pie is $300, minus her PCR), but her chances of winning
the contract substantially increase because Boaz’s profits from contracting with
her are increased from $200 to $300.
Assuming, for simplicity, that Ruth and Naomi are identical in all relevant
aspects, such that if they both invest in PCR or if they both avoid the investment,
each has a 50% likelihood of winning the contract, whereas if only one of them
invests, the investor will surely obtain the contract, we get the following 2x2
game:

57

PCR(Ruth)=$120

PCR(Ruth)=$0

PCR(Naomi)=$120

$30; $30

$0; $180

PCR(Naomi)=$0

$180; $0

$100; $100

Notice that if a PCR increases the probability that a contract is materialized, the supplier will have at least
some Added-Value Motivation to invest in it. For instance, if Ruth can, by investing in PCR, raise the
chances of convincing Boaz to renovate his house by 10%, then she has an Added-Value Motivation to do
so, even if the PCR has no effect whatsoever on the amount of money she would receive under the
contract. By contrast, the effect of the PCR on the probability that one supplier would be preferred over
other suppliers provides only Competition-Based Motivation. This is the case when a PCR raises by 10%
the probability that Ruth, rather than Naomi, would receive the invitation to renovate Boaz’s house, but
does not increase neither the probability of renovation nor the payment received by the performing
contractor.
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In this prisoners’ dilemma game, both suppliers are better off not investing in
PCR (an expected benefit of $100). Nevertheless, the competition may well
induce the two of them to invest in PCR, which forms the only Nash equilibrium
in this game.58 Thus, Ruth has strictly less Added-Value Motivation to invest in
PCR than she has in Example 1 (since her share in the surplus generated by her
investment is now lower than it was when she did not face competition59).
Nevertheless, in the present example Ruth has a sufficient Competition-Based
Motivation to invest in PCR, which forces her to make this investment.
Thus, the fact that PCR is a “sunk cost” when the contractual pie is divided between
the contracting parties implies that the Added-Value Motivation to invest in PCR may
be deficient. Yet, in competitive markets, this deficiency may be compensated by the
existence of a Competition-Based Motivation to invest in PCR. If so, the holdup
problem may not materialize.60 Note that the Competition-Based Motivation may create
incentives to over-invest in PCR. For instance, in Example 2, a sum of $240 is invested
(each supplier invests $120) to generate a surplus of only $200.
The level of investment in PCR that is induced by Competition-Based Motivation
must be assessed on the basis of specific characteristics of the markets in which the
negotiating parties operate. One obvious factor is the existence of competition. The
extreme case is that of a bilateral monopoly. In such case, each party’s incentives to
invest are based exclusively on the Added-Value Motivation, and one should expect a
holdup problem that leads to an inadequate investment in PCR.61 Other cases of
imperfect competition are much harder to predict. When both parties have considerable
market power (i.e., when the suppliers operate in an oligopoly and the purchasers
operate in an oligopsony), it is impossible to say, without a careful inspection of the
market structure, whether the Competition-Based Motivation will make up for the
deficiency in the Added-Value Motivation.
Assume, however, a relatively competitive environment, i.e., a market in which
there are no substantial artificial or natural entry barriers.62 In this case, one may expect
that the investing party will not be able to extract the benefit generated from her PCR.
Nevertheless, a supplier has an interest in investing in PCR in order to improve her
58

Regardless of Naomi’s move, Ruth is strictly better-off investing in the PCR: if Naomi invested, Ruth
receives $30 rather than zero; and if Naomi did not invest, Ruth receives $180 rather than $100. The same
is true for Naomi. Hence, assuming Ruth and Naomi cannot coordinate, each would invest in the PCR and
receive an expected value of $30.

59

If Naomi does not invest, Ruth will get the same added-value as in Example 1 ($100), but if Naomi
invests, Ruth will get this added value in a probability of one-half, such that her Added-Value Motivation
will decrease to $50.

60

For a related argument, see Leonardo Felli and Kevin Roberts, Does Competition Solve the Holdup
Problem?, CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 317 (2000) (showing that when both sellers and buyers operate
in competitive markets, the level of investment in equilibrium is expected to be efficient).

61

The post-contractual stage is analogical to this case, assuming that the costs of replacing the contracting
party (including legal remedies) are sufficiently high. See supra note 56, and accompanying text.
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GEORGE STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY (Homewood, IL: Irwin., 1968); Harold Demsetz,
Why Regulate Utilities, 11 J. OF L. & ECON. 55 (1968); Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 AM. ECON.
REV. 47 (1982); Preston R. McAfee, Hugo M. Mialon & Michael A. Williams, What Is a Barrier to
Entry? 94 AM. ECON. REV. 461 (2004).
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chances of obtaining the contract. Yet, for any rational supplier, “getting the contract” is
only a means to gaining profits (the supplier’s surplus). If the supplier’s surplus does
not cover the winning party's investment in PCR, she is better off avoiding the
investment and the participation in the negotiation altogether. Thus, the existence and
extent of the Competition-Based Motivation must be evaluated in light of the reward
that is offered to the winning supplier in the relevant market.63 The size of this surplus is
a feature of market structure. In the sections below, we present the magnitude of the
expected PCR in two typical competitive markets. The important outcome of this
analysis is that in some cases that we will specify, the invisible hand of market forces
induces optimal PCR, whereas in others, the predicted outcome is excessive PCR.
In addition, we will analyze one bargaining party's interest and ability to affect the
other party’s incentives to invest in PCR. A purchaser can sometimes affect the
Competitive-Based Motivation of a potential supplier by providing an optimistic
assessment of the prospects of contracting or by intensifying the competition between
suppliers. In contrast, he can save a given supplier (or all of them) some expenditures by
taking the PCR upon itself. In the analysis that follows, we identify the cases in which
an undesirable manipulation of a party’s Competition-Based Motivation can be
expected, and we suggest several policy implications in this respect.
The wide-ranging conclusion of our discussion should be clear by now: An
adequate examination of the incentives to invest in PCR, and the level of PCR they
bring about, can only be performed within a well-defined market structure. It is
impossible to make any a-priori predictions about the level of investment in PCR
without a thorough examination of the market in which the negotiating parties operate.
We shall now proceed to conduct such an analysis of (relatively) competitive markets.
V. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE DISCUSSION
The analysis of the expected level of investment in PCR within a given market structure
is quite complex, mainly due to the vast number of divergent scenarios in which it is
relevant. For the sake of clarity, we find it helpful to consider the matter within a welldefined scenario.64 Our general scenario is as follows: One party, “the purchaser,” is
interested in purchasing certain goods or services, and a group of potential suppliers
(“the suppliers”) compete over the right to supply these goods or services to the
purchaser.65 One may think, for example, of an employer who is interviewing potential
employees, or of a landowner who has to choose between available contractors. The
competition between suppliers (workers, contractors) takes place through the
negotiation process between each supplier and the purchaser (employer, landowner),
and it is concluded when the purchaser chooses one of the suppliers as his contracting
partner.
63

Notice that while the Added-Value Motivation is based only on the division of the surplus from the PCR
between the supplier and the purchaser, the Competition-Based Motivation is set according to how the
entire surplus from the contract is divided between the parties.

64

For the role of well defined settings in the development of general legal theories, see Carol M. Rose, The
Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175 (1997).

65

The choice of the “supplier” as the focus of our attention is purely arbitrary. Similarly, we arbitrarily refer
to all suppliers as female and to all purchasers as male.
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During the negotiation process, each supplier who wishes to compete for the
contract needs to invest some resources (PCR). Each supplier must gather information,
prepare a bid, take initial preparatory steps, and bear opportunity costs. For instance,
work candidates must spend time and travel expenses in order to attend a job interview;
potential contractors need to make initial plans and estimations in order to submit their
bids, and so forth. We take these investments to be relationship-specific and thus “sunk”
by the time the final stage of the negotiation takes place.
In our scenario, we assume that the negotiation process takes the following form: At
the starting point, each of the potential suppliers decides whether to invest (for instance,
in acquiring information). The expected contribution of the investment to the
contractual surplus is known before it is made, though its actual contribution to the
contractual surplus may be uncertain. In the next phase, each supplier—who either
invested or avoided PCR—“negotiates” with the purchaser. Based on the offer that each
supplier submits, the purchaser selects the best supplier for him. The negotiation and
selection processes in our scenario are not restricted to any specific mechanism. They
may be based on an auction, on sequential negotiation, or on any other mechanism.
The market in which the suppliers operate is a competitive market in the sense that
there are no legal or economic entry barriers.66 Would-be suppliers are free to enter the
market and to bid for contracts. For instance, there is nothing that prevents new college
graduates from applying for a job or would-be contractors from submitting bids, and if
their offers are the best ones, they will get the job. The effect of the free entry
assumption is significant. It implies that if the suppliers’ market generates “abovenormal” profits (i.e., profits that exceed the yield on alternative feasible investments at a
similar risk level), it will attract newcomers who, in the long run, will reduce the profit
level to normal. As a result, the market cannot generate “above-normal” profits in the
long term.
We start by analyzing a market where the competing suppliers are “professional,”
repeating players (Part VI), and then move to one where they are “accidental,” one-time
players (Part VII).
VI. THE INVESTMENT IN PCR IN REPEATING PLAYERS MARKETS
The aim of the current section is to explore the parties' motivations to invest in PCR
within a specific market—a Repeating Players Market of suppliers. It is a competitive
market in which the suppliers are “professional,” in the sense that they compete over
many deals and intend to stay in the market for the long run. These are suppliers who, as
part of their course of business, enter a similar type of negotiations and auctions, and
hence compete continuously over many contracts.
We assume that free entry to the suppliers’ market is possible, but experience and
reputation do play a role. Experience lowers the cost of performance, and reputation
reduces the cost of marketing the quality of performance. As a result, suppliers who are
66

By contrast, we make no assumptions as to the market in which the purchaser operates. He may be
operating within a competitive market as well, but, then again, he may be a monopolist. Our inquiry
focuses on the effect of competition on the investment in PCR, and, for that purpose, and for the sake of
clarity, we prefer to concentrate on one side of the negotiating table.
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already in the market benefit from a competitive advantage over would-be suppliers.
More specifically, we assume that a one-time accidental bidder will find it prohibitively
expensive to bid in a Repeating Players Market. The dynamics that make this
assumption plausible reflect the fact that success in such a market is a function of
experience and reputation, which are acquired only through actual participation in the
market. In other words, we assume that the suppliers' market is open only to newcomers
that are aimed at becoming “professional,” repeating players.67
Such a market structure is abundant. Prominent examples include the market for
commercial construction projects, insurance agencies, investment banks and brokers,
travel agencies, architects, computer and communication service providers, and car
dealers. They all invest, on a regular basis, in PCR—either in a search for a lucrative
contract or in submitting a bid in a competition—without expectation to be reimbursed
if they do not receive the contract.
In a nutshell, our general argument is that in a Repeating Players Market the
supplier’s surplus that this market-structure generates secures all suppliers a sufficient
compensation for their PCR, and as a general matter, the Competition-Based Motivation
induces them to invest in PCR at the socially desirable level. Consequently, the
purchaser internalizes the full costs of suppliers’ investment in PCR and has adequate
incentives to limit the number of suppliers with whom he negotiates. Given these
results, we conclude that, subject to few concrete qualifications, intervention in the
parties' freedom of (and from) contract is generally unwarranted on an efficiency basis
in Repeating Players Markets.
A. Compensation for PCR
Apparently, because PCR is already “sunk” when the price is set, the suppliers who
reach the final stage of the negotiation process will be willing to cut down their offers
and settle only on the cost of performance, in order to win the contract. However, this
prediction is not self-evident. We argue that it is more probable that in a Repeating
Players Market the suppliers will be compensated for their PCR.
Such an outcome is apparent when not only the suppliers but the purchaser too is a
repeating player. Purchasers who exploit their bargaining power to obtain a price that
does not cover suppliers’ precontractual investments will have a difficult time
persuading suppliers to enter the current negotiations or to invest in PCR in the future.
Thus, a purchaser who expects to be interested in acquiring the services of one of the
suppliers in the future may well have an interest in agreeing to pay a price that
67

Note that if the “no one-time-accidental-bidder” assumption does not hold, the market will collapse into a
One-Time Players Market—a market structure that we study in Part VII. An exception to this rule seems
to be markets like the secondary market for stocks and other financial instruments, in which a dual market
structure is sustained (i.e., a market in which both professionals and non-professionals operate) due to
different return rates for professional and non-professional players. Compare Zohar Goshen and Gideon
Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets and “Negative” Property Rights in Information, 87 VA. L.
REV. 1229 (2001) (arguing that the prohibition on inside trading serves as a vehicle to provide for a higher
rate of return to “professional” analysts). If so, then for the purpose of this paper, such dual markets can
be treated as two distinguished markets—one for professionals repeating players and the other for nonprofessional one-time players.
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compensates the supplier for her investment in PCR, in order to induce suppliers to
negotiate to invest in PCR in future transactions with him.68 We suggest that this
outcome can be expected even if the purchaser is not a repeating player.
Our contention is based on two related arguments. One line of reasoning is
empirical. The long-run equilibrium price in a Repeating Players Market necessarily
compensates suppliers for their investment in PCR. The long run is defined as the
duration for which exit from and entry to the market are unlimited, such that all costs—
including precontracutal ones—are variable costs. A supplier will thus avoid production
if she is not fully compensated for her entire costs, including her PCR. Therefore, an
observation that a certain market is a “contestable” Repeating Players Market (i.e., entry
and exit are free) implies that the players in this market do not incur a loss from their
activity, such that the price includes what we term a Compensation Factor (CF). This
factor comes on top of the marginal costs (MC) of performing the contract and is
therefore equal to the supplier’s surplus from the contract.
In equilibrium, the average CF can be neither lower nor higher than each supplier’s
average operational costs per contract (i.e. the average amount of PCR that any given
supplier makes in order to secure one contract). If the average CF is lower than this
value, some suppliers who operate in the market are losing, and they will be induced to
leave the market.69 The remaining suppliers will then possess greater market power and
will be able to extend the average CF. This process of suppliers leaving the market will
end when the market price fully covers the operation costs of suppliers who remain in
the market. If the average CF exceeds this value, the operation in this market yields
“above-normal” profits for at least some of the suppliers. Accordingly, it will attract
new suppliers to enter the market in order to become professional suppliers. This
process of market expansion will reduce the bargaining power of suppliers, and hence
the supplier’s surplus. The process will continue until the average CF equals the
expected operational costs per contract of any given supplier.70
Indeed, numerous studies have confirmed the assessment that the price in a
Repeating Players Market compensates the suppliers for their “sunk” investments. For
instance, it was found that license fees paid at the auction (a sunk cost) do affect

68

Compare Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 304 (1978) (An “effective
extralegal market…mechanism of contract enforcement may operate by offering to the potential cheater a
future ‘premium,’ more precisely, a price sufficiently greater than average variable (that is, avoidable)
cost to assure a quasi-rent stream”).

69

There is an extensive economic literature analyzing the characteristics of the firms that are expected to
exit the market in such cases. See, e.g., Paolo G. Garella and Yves Richelle, Exit, Sunk Costs and the
Selection of Firms, 13 ECONOMIC THEORY 643 (1999).

70

WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 661 (6th ed., Dryden Press, 1995) (“Even in the absence
of price-taking behavior in markets with relatively few firms, perfect contestability provides an ‘invisible
hand’ that guides market equilibrium to a competitive-type result [of zero profits]”); W. J. Baumol,
Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure, AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1982); W.J.
BAUMOL, J.C. PANZAR, & R.D. WILLIG CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY OF
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (San Diego, California, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982); Chris Stefanadis, Sunk
Costs, Contestability, and the Latent Contract Market, 12 J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 119
(2003).
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consumer prices.71 The market price compensates investment banks who incur a sunk
cost to establish a relationship with a firm, even though the firm is free to deal with
other banks, on an arm's-length basis.72 In surveys of pricing practices of U.S.
companies, several studies reported that most firms that operate in a Repeating Players
Market treat fixed and sunk costs as relevant for pricing decisions.73
A second line of reasoning for this outcome is based on the prospect of tacit
collusion. When suppliers repeatedly interact, tacit collusion that results in a price that
compensates them for their PCR can be sustained. This occurs if the gains that each
supplier derives from continued cooperation—i.e., from offering a price that covers all
her costs including PCR—outweigh the gains from undercutting to grab more deals—
i.e., offering a price that does not cover her “sunk costs.” Stated differently, if each
supplier’s long-term loss from a price war outweighs her short-term gain from pricecutting, and assuming that repeating players can observe systematic price-cuts, tacit
collusion becomes sustainable.74 In fact, tacit collusion between suppliers is essential in
order to support a long-run Repeating Players Market.75 Obviously, as in any repeated
game, there are multiple equilibria.76 Yet, the equilibrium in which the price
compensates the suppliers for their PCR seems more probable, at least in “contestable”
markets, in which lower price equilibrium will induce suppliers to exit the market, and
higher price equilibrium will attract new suppliers to enter.77

71

Theo Offerman & Johannes (Jan) J.M. Potters, Does Auctioning of Entry Licenses Affect Consumer
Prices? An Experimental Study, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH WORKING PAPER NO. 2000-53
(2000).

72

Bharat N. Anand & Alexander Galetovic, Relationships, Competition and the Structure of Investment
Banking Markets, HBS COMP. & STRATEGY WORKING PAPER NO. 01-038; CEA WORKING PAPER NO. 96
(2000).

73

Vijay Govindarajan, & Robert Anthony, How Firms Use Cost Data in Pricing Decisions, 1983
MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING (July) 30 (82% of the 505 Fortune 1000 companies surveyed used full cost
pricing); Eun Sup Shim & Ephraim Sudit, How Manufacturers Price Products, 1994 MANAGEMENT
ACCOUNTING (February) 37 (70% of the 141 companies surveyed used full cost-based pricing); MICHAEL
W. MAHER, CLYDE R. STICKNEY, & ROMAN L. WEIL, MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTING 258 (8th Edition.
Mason, Ohio: South-Western, 2004) (“Overwhelmingly, companies around the globe use full costs rather
than variable costs” in their pricing decision); CHARLES T. HORNGREN, SRIKANT M. DATAR, & GEORGE
M. FOSTER, COST ACCOUNTING 427-40 (9th Edition. NJ: Prentice Hall, 2000) (report surveys in
which a majority of managers in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia take fixed and sunk
costs into account in pricing).
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For a general presentation of the concept of tacit collusion, see JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION (1988), ch. 6. Absent some evidence of communication or coordination, mere parallel
pricing is not considered as an agreement violating Sherman Act section 1. See, e.g., Theater Enterprises
v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954); United States v. General Motors Corp.,
1974-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) P 75,253, at 97,662 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Williamson Tobacco Corp. & Brooke
Group v. Brown, 13 S.Ct. 2578 (1993).
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Tacit collusion between suppliers can break down, and the competition can become fierce. If that happens,
the market will behave, at least in the short run, like a One-time Players Market that we analyze in Part
VII infra.
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DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 505-515 (Princeton, N.J., 1990).

77

Note that an accidental, one-time bidder cannot be deterred from acting "non-cooperatively,” by accepting
a price that does not cover her “sunk costs” (“hit-and-run”). Thus, the market price will include a CF that
fully covers the parties' PCR only if professional, repeating players have a sufficient advantage over
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These two lines of thinking—one based on empirical observation the other on game
theory—suggest that in equilibrium it is probable that the CF mechanism covers no
more and no less than the full operational costs of suppliers who conduct businesses in
Repeating Players Market.
Notice that a supplier can only collect the CF when she wins the contract. Hence,
the CF comprises two elements: a cost factor, which represents the typical PCR that a
supplier needs to invest in the given market per negotiation; and a multiplier, which is
negatively correlated with the supplier’s chances of receiving the contract (i.e., the
suppliers’ winning ratio).
Example 3: Assume that four similar firms compete over construction projects in
a Repeating Players Market. Each firm's variable costs (which are spent only by
the firm chosen to perform the contract) are drawn from a similar distribution,
with an expected value of $1,000,000. In addition, each firm must invest $25,000
in PCR in order to submit a bid. We argue that the market price in this example
will be $1,100,000—the expected value of the variable costs ($1,000,000) plus
the Compensation Factor ($100,000), which is equal to PCR ($25,000) multiplied
by each supplier’s winning ratio (1:4).
The cost factor in the CF ($25,000 in Example 3) is an element that characterizes
the market. Seemingly, a supplier may be better off investing a lower level of PCR than
the one reflected in the CF. The supplier who wins the contract collects the CF
regardless of her actual level of investment in PCR, because neither the cost factor nor
the multiplier are affected by the individual supplier's level of investment in PCR.
Indeed, investing at a lower level of PCR decreases the bidder's likelihood of success,
but it also decreases her expenditures. Thus, the possibility that the latter effect exceeds
the former cannot be ruled out in the short run or for an occasional supplier. However, if
a discrepancy between the CF and the actual level of investment in PCR prevails, then
the market price does not form long-term equilibrium. If suppliers can regularly benefit
from investing less in PCR than the level reflected by the CF, they are expected to
choose this lower level of investment. As a result, the market price will reflect “abovenormal” profits, and new suppliers will enter the market. The reverse process will occur
if suppliers find it worthwhile, as a general rule, to spend more than the level of
investment that is reflected in the CF: The market price will lie below operational costs,
and suppliers will leave the market. Therefore, in equilibrium, all suppliers are expected
to invest the same level of PCR—the one that is reflected in the CF.78

accidental, one-time players, that is, only if the conditions of a Repeating Players Market hold. See text to
note 67 supra.
78

Note that if the suppliers are not identical, the less efficient ones will be forced to leave the market. A
supplier whose operational costs are higher or whose quality of performance is lower than that of the
average supplier faces a worse winning ratio. As a result, the CF will not cover her PCR, and she will be
forced out of the market. Parallel analysis applies to suppliers whose PCR is higher than average. The CF
will not cover their investment in PCR, and they will be forced either to economize or to leave the market.
The only divergence that the market allows is between suppliers who can compensate for their relative
weakness in one parameter by their relative strength in another. Note also that a low-cost firm can earn
positive long-run profits. However, such extra profits will be reflected in the price of the resource that
accounts for the firm's low costs. An active market for the firms' inputs will ensure that average costs are
the same for all firms in the long run.
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The fact that the cost factor in the CF is an element that characterizes the market
implies that the purchaser cannot easily control it.79 By contrast, the multiplier (4 in
Example 3) is an element that characterizes the specific negotiation, and hence
purchasers can quite easily manipulate it by limiting the number of suppliers with which
they negotiate.80 For instance, an entrepreneur's decision to negotiate with only two
firms will reduce the multiplier from 4 to 2 and the CF from $100,000 to $50,000. Yet,
these savings are not without costs, as elaborated below; dealing with fewer suppliers
means less competition and a lower chance of finding the most efficient supplier in the
market.81
Our basic argument is thus that in a Repeating Players Market the price may well
compensate the suppliers for their PCR, such as the costs of submitting a bid. In these
cases—and we suggest that these are the more common ones—the suppliers are
motivated to compete for the right to contract with the purchaser. Thus, the suppliers
have an incentive to invest in PCR in order to increase their chances of winning, even if
they expect that they will not be able to extract the full (or even any portion of the)
benefits generated by the investment.
Consider, for instance, the case of Venture Assocs. v. Zenith Data Sys.82 The parties
negotiated for several months based on the statement of the defendant, ZDS, that it was
willing to sell its subsidiary for $11 million, but negotiations failed after ZDS raised the
price to $14 million. The Court rejected Venture’s argument that ZDS acted in bad faith.
Judge Posner explained: “Not having locked itself into the $ 11 million price, ZDS was
free to demand as high a price as it thought the market would bear, provided that it was
not trying to scuttle the deal ... or to take advantage of costs sunk by Venture in the
negotiating process.”83 The facts in this case indicate that Venture was a repeating
player in the relevant market of acquisitions. As such, the market price is expected to
compensate Venture for her investment in PCR (through the CF), and thus to motivate
her to make such investments, making legal intervention unwarranted.84

79

The purchaser can take upon himself some PCR and thus reduce the actual costs of negotiation for the
suppliers (e.g., he can provide the suppliers with the necessary information needed to prepare their bids).
Yet, the effect of such a strategy on the CF is unclear. See infra Part VI.B.4.

80

As a general matter, the multiplier in the CF may depend on market characteristics (such as, a supplier’s
average likelihood of winning) that cannot be manipulated by the purchaser. Nevertheless, it seems
plausible to assume that the purchaser can control at least some factors that set the CF. We assume, for
simplicity, that the multiplier is such a factor. Our conclusions with respect to the multiplier are applicable
to any element of the CF that the purchaser can manipulate.

81

See infra Part VI.B.1.
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96 F.3d 275 (7th Cir. 1996).
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Ibid., at 279-280.
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See also, e.g. Owasso Development Co. v. Ass. Wholesale Grocers, Inc. 873 P.2d 212 (C.A. of Kansas,
1994); Regalian Properties plc v. London Docklands Development Corp. [1995] 1 All E.R. 1005 (Ch.)
(The plaintiff, a land developer, claimed more then £3,700,000 that it allegedly paid to various
professional firms for extensive planning work in respect of a contract that never materialized. The court
rejected the claim, explaining that in its view “however much the parties expect a contract between them
to materialise, both enter negotiations expressly… on terms that each party is free to withdraw from the
negotiations at any time”).
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An important result of the Competition-Based Motivation is that professional
suppliers are not deterred from entering the negotiation process, and from reasonably
investing in PCR, by the fact that the purchaser is conducting parallel negotiations with
other suppliers. Inasmuch as the CF is positively correlated with the number of suppliers
who enter the negotiation process, more competitors means a lower chance of getting
the contract, but also a greater “reward” (CF) for winning the contract. These two
effects cancel out each other, and therefore the individual supplier is indifferent to the
number of suppliers with whom she is competing. In fact, in a Repeating Players
Market, it is the purchaser (and not the suppliers) who has an interest in limiting the
number of suppliers with whom he negotiates to an efficient level. This occurs because
the costs of the suppliers’ PCR are passed on to the purchaser through the CF
mechanism.
B. The Level of PCR
What remains to be explored is what level of investment in PCR is expected in a
Repeating Players Market. We suggest that Competition-Based Motivation can be
expected to induce a level of investment in PCR that is relatively close to the socially
optimal one. We will demonstrate this argument both with respect to the number of
suppliers who enter the negotiation process and to the amount that each of them spends
on PCR.
1. The Number of Bidders
Consider first the level of participation in the negotiation process within Repeating
Players Markets. As we mentioned above, suppliers, who are compensated for their
PCR expenditures through the CF mechanism, are indifferent to the participation rate.
Therefore, they will enter the negotiation (and invest in PCR) regardless of the social
optimum. By contrast, the purchaser has strong incentive to lower the size of the CF
(which he pays) and should therefore strive to limit the participation rate of suppliers.
It is socially optimal to increase the number of bidders only as far as the marginal
expected benefit of adding a bidder exceeds the marginal expected cost. An additional
bidder has a potential of increasing the contractual surplus. The marginal expected
benefit reflects the chance that the added costs of performance to the additional bidder
will be lower or that the quality of that bidder's performance will be higher than that of
the best of the other bidders.85 The marginal cost is the additional supplier’s expenditure
on PCR. The purchaser bears the full costs of suppliers’ PCR, through the CF, and he
thus internalizes the social costs of an additional bidder. The purchaser also captures the
surplus generating from an additional bidder, given our assumption of competition in
the suppliers’ market. As a result, the purchaser’s own interests regarding the number of
bidders coincide with the socially desirable ones, such that the number of bidders in a
Repeating Players Market is expected to be optimal.
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Compare, e.g., J Bulow & P. Klemperer, Auctions v. Negotiations, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 180 (1996)
(showing the advantages of attracting an extra bona fide bidder).
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The same reasoning implies that in certain cases the purchaser may be better off
limiting the number of suppliers with whom he negotiates. Inasmuch as the price in
Repeating Players Markets reflects the overall expenditure on PCR by suppliers, the
purchaser may well have an incentive to limit the number of suppliers with whom he
negotiates, in order to reduce the CF. The lower the likelihood that a bid wins, the
higher the multiplier that sets the CF and thus the higher the price that the purchaser is
expected to pay. This implies that a purchaser who deals with suppliers that operate in
Repeating Players Markets should be allowed, from an efficiency perspective, to limit
the number of suppliers with whom he enters negotiations.86
The preceding analysis sheds new light on the famous case of Heyer Products Co. v.
U.S.,87 which is often considered as the basis for the rule that a party who negotiates
without intent to contract breaches his duty to act in good faith.88 In this case, the
Ordnance Tank Automotive Center (OTAC) published a procurement to purchase
circuit testers. The plaintiff, Heyer, submitted the lowest bid, but OTAC preferred
another bidder, whose offer was almost twice the price asked by Heyer. Heyer argued
that the invitation to participate in the procurement procedures was a mere pretense
because OTAC was not willing to contract with it in the first place, as part “of a
deliberate artifice to retaliate against [Heyer] for testifying against OTAC at a Senate
hearing."89 The U.S. Claims Court accepted the view that “it was an implied condition
of the request for offers that each of them would be honestly considered, and that that
offer which in the honest opinion of the contracting officer was most advantageous to
the Government would be accepted. … No bidder would have put out $7,000 in
preparing its bid as plaintiff says it did, if it had known the OTAC had already
determined to give the contract to [another bidder]. … It had a right to think [that its bid
was to be honestly considered]. … This is what induced it to spend its money to prepare
its bid.”90
From the bidder’s perspective, the Court’s analysis is clearly correct. However, our
analysis suggests that, as a general matter, an auctioneer in OTAC’s position has a
strong economic interest against inviting a “dummy” bidder whom he has no serious
intention to honestly consider. As argued above, in a Repeated Players Market (and it
seems that Heyer operated within such a market structure), the purchaser (auctioneer)
bears the full costs of suppliers’ (bidders’) PCR, through the CF mechanism. Thus, the
86

For a related argument see David Hirshleifer & I.P.L. Png, Facilitation of competing bids and the price of
a takeover target, 2 REV. FINANCIAL STUD. 587 (1989) (Analyzing a model in which the price of the
target need not be higher with competitive bidding than with a single deterring bid, such that the expected
price of the target may be higher when the first bidder makes a deterring bid than when there is
competitive bidding).
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140 F. Supp. 409 (U.S. Court of Claims, 1956).
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Friedrich Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of
Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARV. L. REV. 401, 419-420 (1964); Robert S. Summers, “Good
Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L.
REV. 195, 221-223 (1968).

89

140 F. Supp. 409, 410 (U.S. Court of Claims, 1956).
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140 F. Supp. 409, 412-413 (U.S. Court of Claims 1956). However, the Court, in subsequent proceedings
rejected Heyer’s claim that its bid was not honestly considered: 177 F. Supp. 251 (U.S. Court of Claims,
1959).
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purchaser bears the “dummy” bidder’s costs of preparing her bid. Assuming that the
other bidders are not aware of the auctioneer’s intention to ignore this specific bid, each
of them demands a price that reflects her perceived likelihood of success, given that all
bids are honestly considered.91 Furthermore, assuming the market is already a
competitive one, the purchaser cannot improve his bargaining position by adding a
“dummy” bidder. Thus, employing such a strategy is irrational, in that it costs money
both to the “dummy” bidder and to the auctioneer.92 This argument explains why claims
of this sort (lack of serious intent to contract) are so rare.93 In fact, such a strategy can
be rational only when the suppliers operate in a noncompetitive market, or if there is
some kind of irrationality or “agency problem” with the auctioneer.94 The facts of Heyer
Products Co. v. U.S. give substantial support to the latter possibility; it is not
inconceivable that OTAC’s officials were interested in some sort of personal vendetta
against Heyer even if it was at the taxpayers' expense. Therefore, the court was clearly
right in denying the motion to dismiss.
2. Investment in Suppliers’ PCR
We next move to evaluate the level of investment in PCR by the individual supplier.95
We first focus on precontractual expenditures that, due to practical reasons such as
verifiability or moral hazard, cannot be passed on to the purchaser. We analyze
transferable PCR afterward.
The social interest in investing in suppliers’ PCR is set according to the margin
between its price (the cost of PCR) and its social benefit (the added value of the PCR—
its effect on the probability that the bid will be the best one, multiplied by the expected
benefits from such an improvement of the best bid). The private incentives of suppliers
to invest in PCR under Competition-Based Motivation are based on the difference
between its cost to the supplier and its benefit to her (the investment's effect in
increasing the probability of winning the contract (i.e., its effect on the probability that
her offer will be the best), multiplied by the expected payoffs of winning (the supplier's
surplus, which equals to the CF)). Therefore, an increase in the added value from the
PCR has only a limited effect on suppliers’ incentives; it affects their motivation to
91

If the other bidders know about the auctioneer's intention to ignore a specific bid, the auctioneer does not
bear the fictitious bidder’s costs of preparing her bid.
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The “beneficiary” of such a strategy is the winning supplier, who receives an artificially inflated CF.
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Such claims are also extremely difficult to prove, as the subsequent proceedings in the Heyer case
demonstrates. See supra note 90.
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A decision maker who does not fully bear the consequences of his activity—such as an office holder in a
governmental agency—might be interested in employing such a strategy, in order to inflict harm on the
“dummy” bidder or to benefit a specific bidder who is tipped about the scheme.

95

As mentioned above, in order to simplify the discussion, we limit our attention to the level of investment
in PCR by one side of the negotiation table, which we arbitrarily chose to be the suppliers’ side. However,
it should cause no great difficulty to look at the flip side of the coin and examine, according to the same
principles, the opposite side of the negotiation table—i.e. the purchasers’ side— provided that they
operate in a competitive market as well. Note, though, that if both parties operate in a competitive
environment, all the “above normal” added value that contracting generates must clear through external
resources' markets, and will not be held either by the supplier or by the purchaser.
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invest in the PCR just to the extent that it influences their prospects of winning the
contract.
In cases in which the social interest and the private incentive are relatively similar,
an optimal investment can be expected as a result of Competition-Based Motivation.
Yet, when the added value of an investment is relatively low but the investment is
expected to substantially increase the investing party's likelihood of winning (for
instance, when the investment is likely to equate her bid to that of the otherwise best
bid, without improving it), an over-investment in PCR should be expected. In the
opposite scenario, when the investment yields a high added value relative to the CF,
with a low probability (e.g., collecting information about an improbable event that
would significantly raise the purchaser's benefit) an outcome of under-investment is
expected. Note that the fact that the added value of the investment in PCR exceeds the
CF will not necessarily result in under-investment in PCR. The CF equals PCR
multiplied by the number of bidders, and can thus be expected to adequately induce
suppliers to invest in PCR. It is only when the effect of the investment on supplier’s
prospects of receiving a contract is relatively low that under-investment in suppliers’
PCR should be expected.96
3. Laidlaw v. Organ and Incentives to Gather Information
Consider in this respect the incentives to gather information and the scope of the duty to
disclose information, by referring to the famous case of Laidlaw v. Organ.97 The
plaintiff, Organ, obtained private information that the Ghent Treaty had been signed
between Britain and the U.S., formally ending the War of 1812. The immediate
inference from this information was that the price of U.S. tobacco would likely increase
significantly, due to the removal of the main obstacle to exporting tobacco from the
U.S. Before the information had become public, Organ consummated an agreement to
purchase tobacco from the defendant, Laidlaw, without disclosing the happy news.
After the information reached the market and the price of tobacco rose by 30% to 50%,
Laidlaw tried to avoid the deal, claiming it was attained by fraud. Chief Justice
Marshall, in a famous dictum, stated that while “each party must take care not to say or
do anything tending to impose upon the other,” a party has no duty to communicate to
the other party “the intelligence of extrinsic circumstances, which might influence the
price of the commodity, …where the means of intelligence are equally accessible to
both parties.”98
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Throughout the analysis, we assume that the cost of PCR is reflected in the CF. This assumption holds,
naturally, only with respect to types of PCR that are recognized as conventional practices in the relevant
market. New or unconventional PCR will not be reflected in the CF, and as such require different
treatment. Yet, a supplier who invests in such PCR before it becomes conventional in the market is likely
to have bargaining power due to her unique position, and therefore her motivations (i.e., the combined
effect of the Added-Value Motivation and of the Competition-Based Motivation) should lead to an
investment that is relatively close to the social desirable one.

97

15 U.S. 178 (2 Wheat) (1817).
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Ibid, p. 195. The Supreme Court nevertheless ordered a new trial (Venire de novo) because the “absolute
instruction of the [district] judge was erroneous …The question, whether any imposition was practiced by
the vendee upon the vendor ought to have been submitted to the jury.”
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As noted above, Antony Kronman justifies C.J. Marshall’s dictum, based on the
view that it gives contracting parties incentives to collect valuable commercial
information.99 One line of criticism of Kronman’s reasoning questions his implicit
assumption that the investment in gathering such information is indeed socially
desirable. Critics of this assumption claim that Organ’s foreknowledge had only privatedistributive value, as oppose to socially-allocative value; it enabled Organ to augment
his share of the contractual pie but did not increase the size of the pie.100 Our criticism
of Kronman’s reasoning is different. Assume, for the sake of argument, that gathering
commercial information of the kind that Organ obtained is socially valuable. Yet, in
order to justify C. J. Marshall’s dictum on an incentive basis, one must also demonstrate
that the opposite rule (i.e., imposing a duty to disclose) creates inefficient incentives,
i.e., that it leads to under-investment in gathering commercial information by parties in
Organ’s position. We challenge the plausibility of such a prediction. Organ was a
commission merchant—a repeating player in a competitive market. In a Repeating
Players Market, the commission that a merchant like Organ charges can be expected to
compensate him for his precontractual investments, including the investment in
collecting “conventional” information (i.e., data about market conditions). If so, the
competition between traders in Organ’s position over the normal surplus that the market
generates for commission merchants should be sufficient to induce an efficient activity
of collecting “conventional” information. Consequently, allowing traders the right to
exploit “conventional” information vis-à-vis wholesalers or producers (i.e., allowing
them to use the information in order to receive part of the added value that it creates) is
not needed in order to induce efficient investment in the collection of such information
by traders who operate in a Repeating Players Market.101
Securing the Added-Value Motivation is essential in a Repeated Players Market
only when the investment is “exceptional” in the sense that it provides significant
rewards only on rare occasions (e.g., discovering oil reserves and other scarce
minerals102). Capturing the CF may not be a sufficient incentive to invest in such PCR,
and hence the non-disclosure doctrine set forth in Laidlaw v. Organ may be justified as
a required mechanism to avoid under-investment in gathering “exceptional”
information.
99

Kronman, supra note 6, at 18. See supra Part II.B.3.
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Craswell, supra note 7, p. 1166 (“The information in question may also have private value, if it allows
someone who knows the information to buy (or sell) the asset before its price changes. In general, there is
no reason why the social and private values should necessarily coincide, and therefore no reason why the
private incentives to gather information will be optimal.”); Jules L. Coleman, Douglas D. Heckathorn &
Steven M. Maser, A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract
Law, 12 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 691-709 (1989); Janet K. Smith & Richard L. Smith, Contract
Law, Mutual Mistake, and Incentives to Produce and Disclose Information, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 467
(1990) (The potential to behave opportunistically by concealing information adverse to a bargainer’s
position may lead to over-investment in an effort to secure a redistributional wealth gain); Robert L.
Birmingham, The Duty to Disclose and the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Laidlaw v. Organ, 29 WILLIAM & MARY
L. REV. 249 (1988).
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The justifications for allowing producers of information to enjoy the fruit of their labor are not limited to
providing adequate incentives to invest in the creation of information. Therefore, our argument should not
be read as a general claim against C. J. Marshall’s dictum, but only as a limited criticism of a certain
justification that was offered for it.

102

Kronman specifically employs these examples to demonstrate his theory. See supra note 6, at pp. 19-21.
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Consider the following hypothetical situation: Paul inherits a painting. Unaware of
its actual value, he offers Linda, a professional art dealer, an opportunity to purchase the
painting for $500. Linda recognizes that the painting is an original Picasso, worth more
than $1,000,000. Must Linda inform Paul of the actual value of the painting?103
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, as well as the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts and the Restatement of Restitution, a nondisclosure doctrine applies in such a
case: “[S]uperior information and better business acumen are legitimate advantages,
which lead to no liability...”.104 As far as this rule is based on the economic rationale of
supplying sufficient incentives to invest in information gathering, we suggest a more
nuanced approach. If the purchaser’s superior knowledge results from an art dealer’s
conventional activity, the interest in securing sufficient incentives to invest does not
support the nondisclosure rule. The dealer is sufficiently motivated through the CF
mechanism of the art dealers market. An opposite result applies in the case of
information gathered as a result of unique and exceptional investment—such as
specialization in the work of a certain painter or in retrieving lost paintings. Such efforts
are not compensated sufficiently by the CF of the art dealers market, and securing the
Added-Value Motivation—through the nondisclosure doctrine—is justified.
4. Allocation of Transferable PCR
We have seen that, in a Repeating Players Market, suppliers' Competition-Based
Motivation is likely to induce them to optimally invest in PCR. However, an additional
essential assessment is whether the investment in PCR would be efficiently allocated
between the parties. In other words, in those cases in which the PCR is transferable
between the parties,105 the question is whether each party has the appropriate incentives
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Such a case was discussed in Estate of Nelson v. Rice, 12 P.3d 238 (Ariz., 2000), but the Court accepted
the purchaser’s factual argument that he was not aware of the picture’s actual value, and thus rejected the
seller’s claim to rescind the transaction. In France, litigation in a case similar to our hypothetical one
ended after 15 years in a judgment in favor of the seller. For details about this long litigation, see
BERNARD RUDDEN, A SOURCE-BOOK ON FRENCH LAW 331-332 (3rd ed., 1991). A description of this
litigation can also be found in Hoffman F. Fuller, Mistake and Error in the Law of Contracts, 33 EMORY
L.J. 41, 88 (1984).
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Restatement of Torts, Second, §551 comment k. See especially illustrations 6 and 7, which deal with a
case of a violin that was sold for $100 to an expert in violins, who knew that it was a Stradivarius worth
$50,000. See also Restatement of Contracts, Second, §161, illustration 10; Restatement of Restitution,
§12, illustration 9.

105

Expenditures are non-transferable if they are non-verifiable by the courts. However, it is questionable
whether such investments are of interest to the economic analysis of contract law. Compare Bebchuk and
Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, p. 430 (explaining their focus on verifiable precontractual investment). Another
reason for non-transferability of PCR is moral hazard problems. Consider for example the case of legal
expenses. A purchaser can reduce the legal fees paid by the suppliers if he drafts the contract in advance,
but such shifting has its cost (it may produce an inefficient contract), and it may not relieve the suppliers
from all of their legal costs (e.g., they might wish to receive legal advice about the content of the specified
contract). In addition, an agreement to reimburse the suppliers for all their legal costs is clearly inefficient,
while an agreement to cover only fixed sums may not be sufficient to shift all expenses. Agreeing to
reimburse suppliers only for reasonable legal expenses may therefore be the best way to shift expenses,
assuming that there is an objective criterion according to which the term “reasonable legal expenses” can
be implemented by the courts.
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to take upon himself PCR that he can perform more efficiently than the other party, and
to shift to the other party only those expenditures that she is better suited for?
We have also seen that, in a Repeating Players Market, the purchaser covers the full
costs of PCR by all parties, through the CF mechanism. It may appear, therefore, that
the purchaser can be expected to optimally take upon himself the transferable PCR that
he can efficiently bear. However, the purchaser may not have sufficient incentive to
optimally bear such PCR. The motivation of the purchaser to invest in transferable PCR
largely depends on the purchaser's ability to affect the CF. When the size of the CF is
sensitive to the actual PCR required from the suppliers (i.e., the CF is elastic to actual
costs), the purchaser internalizes both the costs and benefits of the allocation decision,
and an efficient allocation can be expected. By contrast, if the cost factor in the CF is
not sensitive to the actual PCR that suppliers are required to make (in other words, the
CF is inelastic to actual costs), the purchaser has no reason to bear these PCR upon
himself. Example 4 demonstrates this point.
Example 4: A landowner negotiates with three potential contractors. Assume that
before submitting her bid, each supplier must study the type of land on which the
construction work would be performed. One option is that each contractor would
spend $5,000 privately inspecting the land. A second option is that the landowner
will acquire the relevant data and circulate it to the contractors, but assume that in
order to make it verifiable it would cost the landowner $9,000.
From a social perspective, the landowner should bear the costs of acquiring the
relevant data because it would cost $9,000 rather than $15,000 (three bidders
times $5,000).106 However, from the landowner’s perspective, an investment in
acquiring the data is beneficial only if the amount he spends is smaller than the
reduction in the contractual price he will pay. This raises the question of whether
the landowner's investment in PCR affects the CF that he pays to the winning
contractor. If it does, the private decision will be motivated by almost the same
considerations as the social decision. By contrast, if the landowner cannot affect
the CF, the solution is straightforward: The landowner will prefer not to invest,
because he can save money only by avoiding this investment. In such a case, the
allocation of PCR may well be inefficient.
Note that the costs of the misallocation of transferable PCR are imposed on the
purchaser and not on the suppliers. The consequence of the purchaser’s tendency to shift
PCR to the suppliers is that suppliers in this market, as a general matter, over-invest
during the negotiation stage. As a result, the cost factor in the CF increases to an
inefficient level.107 In other words, purchasers’ inability to coordinate an efficient
allocation of transferable PCR leads to over-investment in PCR by the suppliers, the
cost of which is passed on to each purchaser through the CF of the market. The level of
106

We further assume that even if each contractor is required to spend $5,000 to privately inspect the land,
it is still efficient from a social perspective that all three contractors participate in the negotiation process
(i.e., we assume that the social benefits from the participation of the third contractor in the negotiation
process is larger than $5,000).

107

This increase does not stimulate entry to the market, because the suppliers' profit level in that market is
“normal.”
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investment in transferable PCR is thus determined, to a large extent, by the elasticity of
the CF to actual cost. In cases where this elasticity is high, the purchaser has nearly
adequate incentive to efficiently allocate transferable PCR; in cases where this elasticity
is low, the purchaser has a strong tendency to inefficiently shift transferable PCR to the
suppliers.
C. Policy Implications
Incorporating the effects of a Repeating Players Market structure on the level of
investment in PCR has important policy implications, some of which are counterintuitive and go against the currently prevailing views in the law and economics
literature. We point out five normative recommendations.
First, in a Repeating Players Market, the risk of under-investment in PCR is low and
refers mainly to investments that have slim chances of success but produce significant
added value to the contractual surplus. Therefore, as a general matter, legal intervention
that aims to encourage investment in PCR is unwarranted in such markets. The forces of
competition provide relatively adequate investment incentives, and the regulation of
contract formation should only facilitate their operation. This result may explain the
reality of commercial parties' disregard for the argued prospect of under-investment in
PCR. Firms submit bids and invest considerable amounts in PCR, even though
auctioneers almost never promise to reimburse the bidders for their PCR, simply
because the bidders in Repeated Players Markets rationally expect to be compensated
through the market’s “invisible hand.” As far as contract law is concerned, we thus
justify the reluctance to impose precontractual liability in cases of failed negotiations.
Second, the analysis demonstrates that in certain cases a purchaser may be better off
limiting the number of suppliers with whom he negotiates. The normative implication of
this result is that when suppliers operate in Repeating Players Markets, a purchaser
should be allowed, from an efficiency perspective, to limit the number of suppliers in
negotiation. This implication is especially important with respect to public authorities,
inasmuch as their contracting practices are highly regulated and usually include a duty
to conduct an open competition.108 Such an obligation may be justified for other reasons
(e.g., equality or prevention of corruption), but one must bear in mind that it may have a
considerable cost in the form of higher prices due to higher CF.
Third, the main concerns in the case of Repeating Players Markets are of overinvestment rather than under-investment in PCR. Such a result is especially acute with
respect to the allocation of transferable PCR. If allocating transferable PCR to the
individual purchaser does not affect the size of the CF (i.e., if the CF is relatively
inelastic to actual costs), the individual purchaser has a strong motivation to overburden
suppliers with transferable PCR. Such a tendency may cause the market to settle on a
higher level of PCR than is socially desirable, without the individual purchaser being
able to change it. In such cases, legal intervention may be desirable in order to change
the inefficient status-quo, and to move the market into a more efficient equilibrium at a
lower level of investment in transferable PCR.
108

For the requirement of open competition in awarding government contracts, see W. NOEL KEYES,
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS (3rd. ed., 2003) Ch. 6.
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Fourth, the CF is set based on the bidders' expectations of their winning ratio; thus,
the purchaser has an incentive to convince each bidder that her likelihood of success is
high. More optimistic bidders are associated with a lower CF and a lower market price.
Normative intervention may be needed to counteract this temptation, and to prevent the
purchaser from manipulating the suppliers' evaluations of their actual winning
prospects.
Fifth, the CF mechanism is based on the suppliers’ assessment of their likelihood of
winning the contract. An auction, as a highly structured negotiation process, allows
professional bidders to evaluate their success ratio with relative precision. The option of
receiving an outside bid hinders this ability, and as such is undesirable, and should
generally not be allowed.109 Similarly, the purchaser should not be allowed to change
“the rules of the game” after the bidders already invested in PCR. For instance, an
auctioneer should not be allowed to cancel an auction without compensating the bidders
for their PCR in preparing the bids, unless the auctioneer provides the bidders in advance
with sufficient information that allows them to properly account for this risk via the CF
mechanism.110
Finally, consider the issue of the appropriate measure of damages that should be
awarded when a legal intervention is justified. As a general matter, Courts are reluctant
to award expectation damages in cases of breach of the duty to negotiate in good faith,
and tend to settle merely on reliance damages.111 Our analysis shows that this approach
is problematic. By illegitimately changing the “rules of the game,” the purchaser denies
each supplier the chance of gaining the CF, and saves himself the expense of paying it.
Hence, awarding reliance damages (the cost of PCR) is sufficient only if all the
suppliers are compensated for their PCR. Otherwise (e.g. if the damages are awarded
109

Federal Acquisition Regulation §14.404-1 (An auctioneer is prohibited from receiving an offer that was
submitted to him outside of the auction’s procedures).
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Prineville Sawmill Co. v. United States, 859 F.2d 905 (C.A. for the Federal Cir. 1988) (The court
invalidated a decision by the Forest Service to cancel an auction to sell wood, because it imposes on the
bidders a loss of their investment in research and preparing the bids); Planning and Design Solutions v.
City of Santa Fe, 118 N.M. 707; 885 P.2d 628 (1994) (“The City changed the rules in the middle of the
game. PDS was misled because the City did not reveal the true weight it intended for the locality
factor” and was thus awarded reliance damages). See also Richard E. Speidel, Judicial and
Administrative Review of Government Contract Awards, 37 LAW & CONT. PROB. 63, 67-68 (1972) (“If
a pattern of award decisions exists which seem to deviate from ‘the rules of the game’ and there is no
effective way to improve or reverse the pattern, a realistic cost-benefit analysis might induce many
firms to stop or cut back competition for government business and reallocate resources to other
commercial markets.”).
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Copeland v. Baskin Robbins U.S.A., 96 Cal. App. 4th 1251, 1262 (2002) (Damages in cases of breach of
the duty to negotiate in good faith should be limited to the reliance expenditures, because “there is no way
of knowing what the ultimate terms of the agreement would have been or even if there would have been
an ultimate agreement.”). Venture Assocs. v. Zenith Data Sys, 96 F.3d 275, 280-281 (7th Cir. 1996) (Per
J. Cudahy). For the view that as a theoretical matter courts can order expectation damages for breach of a
duty to negotiate in good faith, but as a practical matter they would do so only on rare occasions due to
proof difficulties, see ibid, at 278-279 (per J. Posner) (“It would be a paradox to place a lower ceiling on
damages for bad faith than on damages for a perfectly innocent breach [of contract], though a paradox that
the practicalities of proof may require the courts in many or even all cases to accept.”). See also Schwartz
and Scott, note 24 (“The goals [of inducing efficient investment in PCR] would be advanced by awarding
the faithful party its verifiable reliance costs if the other has wrongfully delayed investment. There is no
need to protect the expectation, which in any event would be hard to do for projects that never get off the
ground.”).
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only to the supplier who submits the highest bid), reliance damages will neither repair
the injury nor deter from the breach. Assuming that multiple lawsuits by all suppliers
are impractical and inefficient, awarding expectation damages to the supplier who
proves the (difficult) case against the purchaser should be preferred.112 The hurdle of
assessing the plaintiff’s expectation interest when a contract is not formed can be
stepped-over by approximating this value according to the sum of the investment in
PCR by all bidders, or through the multiplier that determines PCR, as explained above.
VII. THE INVESTMENT IN PCR IN ONE-TIME PLAYERS MARKETS
The second paradigmatic competitive market that we explore is that of accidental, onetime suppliers. In such a market at least some of the suppliers negotiate for only one
contract, and they intend to leave the market once they attain it (“hit-and-run”).113 A
typical example of such markets is that of private second-hand markets for goods such
as houses and used cars (i.e., markets in which the “supplier” is not a dealer but a
private individual). Another example is the market for long-term employees. Employers
may be repeating players in such markets, but individual workers are usually infrequent
participants, who take part in the labor market only a limited number of times. The
investment in PCR in such a market by one-time players is often non-negligible. In the
labor market, for example, it may include the costs of reallocation and training
according to the needs of a potential employer. What is the expected level of investment
in such expenditures, which are “sunk costs” at the stage of contract formation? What
type of legal intervention is justified, if at all, in this respect?
We begin by showing that if suppliers are fully rational and well informed, the
market price is likely to compensate the suppliers for their investment in PCR even in a
One-Time Players Market. This argument is based on the prediction that the number of
rational negotiating suppliers will drop until each supplier's investment in PCR yields
“normal” profits.
We then move to assess the case where the suppliers are not fully informed or not
fully rational. In this case the price may not cover the suppliers' investment in PCR,
such that the suppliers who invest in PCR will end up losing. However, we challenge
the claim that the bidders' loss will lead to too few suppliers submitting a bid. Actually,
the bidders lose because too many bidders participate. Our pivotal argument in this
respect is that the purchaser has an interest in encouraging too many suppliers to
compete and thus to induce over-investment in PCR. This outcome is based on the
prospect that the market price will not cover the suppliers' aggregate investment in PCR,
such that the purchaser externalizes the costs of over-investment in PCR.
Our central theme in this Part is therefore that in contrast to the prevailing
argument, which calls for legal interventions aimed at encouraging parties to negotiate
and to invest in PCR, in a One-Time Players Market the required legal intervention
should actually be directed at discouraging over-investment in PCR.
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For an analogical argument compare Ofer Grosskopf, Protection of Competition Rules via the Law of
Restitution, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1981, 2002-2008 (2001).
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The fact that these suppliers can successfully compete with professional repeating suppliers means that
the advantage a bidder obtains from participating in previous negotiations or transactions is insignificant.
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A. Rational and Fully Informed One-Time Players
1. Compensation for PCR through the Entry Mechanism
Presumably, a supplier who negotiates in a One-Time Players Market expects, on
average, that her investment, including that in PCR, will yield “normal” profits.
Otherwise, why would she negotiate in the first place? But, given the fact that it is a
competitive market, such that the price is determined according to the suppliers’
marginal cost of production (i.e., given the existence of a holdup problem), how is this
compensation feasible? The important characteristic of the One-Time Players Market is
that each bidder regards the negotiations as an isolated “game.” A bidder thus employs a
strategy that maximizes her expected payoffs in this specific game. For this reason, tacit
collusion between suppliers, which is maintained through the threat of future sanctions,
is unattainable in One-Time Players Markets. Nevertheless, the market's invisible hand
can create a compensation mechanism that guarantees the winning supplier a surplus
that is not lower than her investment in PCR, multiplied by her wining ratio. This
compensation mechanism may be based on the following economic reasoning:114
Contracting creates an added value that is divided between the parties according to
their bargaining power when the contract is concluded. A party’s bargaining power is a
function of the alternative options possessed by the other party: The easier it is to
substitute someone, the less viable she is to her contracting partner. As a result, the
fewer the bidding suppliers, the greater the expected profits that each bidding supplier
derives from the negotiation process and vice versa.
A rational supplier will enter the negotiation process only if she expects that if she
wins she will receive adequate compensation for her PCR.115 Thus, a rational supplier
will not enter the negotiation process unless she predicts that when the contract is
concluded, the winning supplier holds enough bargaining power to ensure such
adequate compensation—i.e. that the number of bidders is sufficiently low to guarantee
that the winning supplier has enough leverage over the purchaser.116 Hence, assuming
that all suppliers are rational and well informed, the invisible market forces will limit
entry in One-Time Players Markets. Entry will continue only until the winning
supplier's bargaining power is sufficient to ensure that the expected supplier’s surplus
covers the suppliers' anticipated participation costs (i.e., the suppliers’ PCR). The
predicted outcome is subject to the negotiation process and to the parties' specific
characteristics, such as the magnitude of their risk aversion, discount factor (loss of
114

For a related argument, see Kenneth R. French & Robert E. McCormick, Sealed Bids, Sunk Costs and the
Process of Competition, 57 J. BUS. 417 (1984) (with a finite number of bidders, each bidder will offer
more than she thinks her variable costs will be, leaving some expected profit for the winner that will cover
her pre-contractual costs).

115

“Adequate compensation” must take into account not only the actual expenditure of the winning supplier
on PCR, but also her winning ratio. See supra Part VI.A.

116

Entry is indeed a binary decision, but suppliers can develop a mixed strategy by which they enter each
negotiation with a certain probability. For the way entry decision are made, see James L. Smith & Dan
Levin, Entry Coordination in Auctions and Social Welfare: An Experimental Investigation, 30 INT. J.
GAME THEO. 321, 348 (2001) (providing empirical evidence that tends to show that partial entry is not a
result of different pure strategies but of mixed entry strategies).
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delay), and so forth. However, as a general rule, the number of bidders correlates
negatively with each bidder's expected benefit from participating in the negotiation,
paving the way to an Entry Mechanism. Example 5 demonstrates this process.
Example 5: Assume that a purchaser expects to derive a benefit of $200,000 from
a project, while the expected value of each bidder's costs of performance
(excluding PCR) is $100,000. Assume that the purchaser selects the winning
supplier through a first-price sealed-bid auction. Assuming that all bidders are
risk-neutral, the Nash bargaining solution of a bidder’s expected benefit from
participating in the auction is the following function of the number of participants
V C
in the bid: CF = 2
. In this function, V is the value that the purchaser
n (n + 1)
derives from performance ($200,000 in our example), C denotes the bidder's costs
of performance excluding PCR ($100,000), and n is the number of (active)
bidders.117 We thus obtain the following results:
Number of suppliers
who negotiate (n)

A supplier’s expected
benefit

Expected price
(Nash bargaining solution)

(supplier’s surplus)

1
2
3
4
5

$50,000
$8,333
$2,778
$1250
$667

$150,000
$108,333
$102,778
$101,250
$100,667

Given the assumption that all suppliers are rational and well-informed, the Entry
Mechanism described above will set the number of suppliers who will take part in
the negotiation, such that the supplier’s surplus equals the bidders' investment in
PCR multiplied by each bidder's winning ratio. For instance, in this numerical
example, if PCR=$900, the market mechanism will induce three suppliers to
invest in PCR and to participate in the bargaining. Each of them will face a 33%
probability of winning. Due to the fact that the supplier’s surplus is $2,778 when
three suppliers submit bids, the active suppliers are just compensated for their
investment in PCR.
The Entry Mechanism thus provides suppliers who operate in One-Time Players
Markets with a Competition-Based Motivation to invest in PCR. The incentive is a
Competition-Based rather than Added-Value Motivation because it relates to the
supplier’s interest in the added value from contracting, and not to her interest in the
added value generated by the PCR. Before moving to assess the magnitude of PCR that
is induced by the Competition-Based Motivation, we briefly comment on the distinction
between the case of One-Time Players Market (Entry Mechanism) and that of Repeating
Players Market (Compensation Factor).
117

Smith & Levin, ibid., at p. 348.
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2. Comparing the Entry Mechanism and the Compensation Factor (CF)
There is considerable similarity between the compensation through the Entry
Mechanism, that is predicted in a One-Time Players Market, and the CF mechanism,
that may exist in Repeating Players Markets.118 In both cases, the suppliers' expected
compensation for their investment in PCR is provided through the surplus that the
winning supplier receives from the contract. Yet, four important distinctions exist
between the two mechanisms.
First, under the CF mechanism, the supplier’s surplus is positively correlated with
the number of suppliers. Therefore, the purchaser has an incentive to reduce the number
of suppliers entering the negotiation process until it reaches an efficient level. By
contrast, under the Entry Mechanism, the supplier’s surplus is negatively correlated with
the number of suppliers. Therefore, the purchaser, who benefits from an increase in the
number of bidders without bearing the costs, has an incentive to extend the number of
suppliers who enter the negotiation process, above the efficient level.119
Second, the size of the CF is established according to the information that the
winning supplier possesses at the final stage of the negotiation process. Hence, new
information that is revealed during the negotiation process will be integrated into the
CF, and will not hinder its performance as a compensation mechanism. By contrast, the
Entry Mechanism depends upon entry and investment decisions that are made prior to
the final stage of the negotiation process. Therefore, it is much less sensitive to
information that is revealed during the negotiation process, and will function poorly if
the purchaser can manipulate the flow of information (e.g., cause suppliers to
underestimate the number of bidders until the investment in PCR is made120).
Third, the cost factor within the CF is determined according to the cost of PCR that
reflects the market standards and not necessarily the supplier’s actual costs. For this
reason, the CF may not be sensitive enough to attempts by the purchaser to influence
suppliers’ expenditures (e.g., by taking transferable PCR upon himself).121 Under the
Entry Mechanism, each supplier makes her entry decision based on her expected PCR
during the specific negotiation. Hence, the purchaser can more easily influence this
mechanism either by actually lowering suppliers’ anticipated PCR or by manipulating
suppliers to be overly optimistic about these costs.

118

Excessive competition in a Repeating Players Market may cause the CF mechanism to collapse, forcing
suppliers, at least for the short run, to behave as if they operate within a One-Time-Players Market. See
supra note 75.

119

For a related argument see Jacques Cremer & Fahad Khalil, Gathering Information before Signing a
Contract, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 566 (1992) (Inducing competition between suppliers enables the purchaser
to deter suppliers from investing in PCR that is aimed at improving each supplier’s bargaining power visà-vis the purchaser).

120

At later stages, the purchaser may want to release this information in order to increase the competition
between suppliers. Such a strategy will work in One-time Players Markets under the Entry Mechanism,
but not in Repeating Players Markets with a CF.

121

See supra Part VI.B.4.
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Finally, the CF is a relatively stable mechanism, supported by repeated interactions
between professional suppliers, on the one hand, and by the constant threat of entry by
would-be suppliers on the other hand. By contrast, the Entry Mechanism is very
unstable, in that it has no long-term driving forces. Furthermore, the Entry Mechanism
depends on strong assumptions about the suppliers’ knowledge and rationality. Such
assumptions are especially problematic within One-Time Players Markets, in which
suppliers, by definition, are inexperienced, and hence much more vulnerable to
manipulations, errors, and cognitive biases.
3. The Level of PCR
We thus argue that the Entry Mechanism provides rational and fully informed suppliers
who operate in One-Time Players Markets with a Competition-Based Motivation to
invest in PCR Yet, the fact that suppliers have some Competition-Based Motivation to
invest in PCR is not sufficient. We further inquire into the scope of this motivation, and
into the difference between the level of PCR it induces and the socially desirable level
of investment in PCR. As indicated above, in a market of One-Time Players, the
purchaser has an incentive to increase the number of bidders. Additional bidders
increase the purchaser’s share of contractual surplus (by reducing the suppliers’ relative
bargaining power). In addition, the costs of additional bidders are not passed on to the
purchaser. Therefore, the purchaser, who benefits from an increase in the number of
bidders without bearing those costs, has an incentive to extend the number of suppliers
who enter the negotiation process above its efficient level.
The purchaser can encourage excessive entry of suppliers in two ways. One
possibility is to change suppliers' winning ratio after they have invested in PCR (e.g.,
adding an outsider to an auction after the bidders submitted their bids). Convincing
potential bidders to enter negotiations based on one set of beliefs, and then changing the
rules of the game, is clearly an inappropriate way to induce additional competition, and
should thus be prevented.122
A second possible strategy aimed at encouraging excessive entry is for the
purchaser to bear the costs of transferable PCR.123 The purchaser may find it beneficial
to bear these additional costs in order to increase the number of bidders and thus to
enhance his relative bargaining power. The following example demonstrates this
possibility.
Example 6: Assume that five law school graduates apply for a one-year job
opportunity with a large firm in Miami. The firm is interested in interviewing the
candidates and can either ask them to come to Miami, at a cost of $1,000 each, or
send an executive to the law school for a cost of $2,500. The firm’s expected
benefit from recruiting one of the candidates is $200,000, while each candidate's
reservation value is $100,000. The size of the offer depends on the number of
candidates who are willing to negotiate with the firm. Specifically, assume that
122

The argument offered in this respect regarding the Repeated Players Market (see supra notes 109 and 110
and accompanying text) applies here, a-fortiori.

123

For the definition of transferable PCR see supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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the actual offers that the firm makes are given by the bargaining solutions
depicted in Example 5.124
Assume that all parties are rational and well informed. In this case, if the firm
asks the candidates to travel to Miami, each will make the following calculation:
The traveling cost of $1,000 is worth spending only if no more than two
candidates make the journey.125 The firm prefers sending its executive to the
candidates, because at a cost of $2,500 it can increase the number of bidders from
2 to 5, and thus increase its net surplus by $5,167.126
Example 6 demonstrates that the purchaser (the firm) has an interest in taking
transferable PCR (travel expenses) upon himself, in order to encourage entry by
relatively sophisticated and well-informed one-time players (law school graduates).
Under the assumption that both the suppliers and the purchaser are rational and well
informed, and on the condition of sufficient transferable PCR, we can thus conclude that
the Entry Mechanism induces either efficient or excessive entry. In addition, the level of
investment in PCR by each supplier in this case is expected to resemble the socially
optimal one, based on the Competition-Based Motivation. The qualifications stated in
this respect in Part VI, regarding Repeated Players, apply here as well.127
B. One-Time Players Who are not Rational or not Fully Informed
There are good reasons to question the plausibility of the assumption that suppliers in a
One-Time Players Market are fully rational and fully informed in making their entry
decision. The Entry Mechanism is based on the assumption that each supplier knows,
among other things, the number of other active suppliers. It seems that whereas in a
Repeating Players Market a supplier can reasonably acquire this type of information, it
is implausible to assume accessibility to such data in the case of accidental, one-time
suppliers. Moreover, the Entry Mechanism is based on the ability of potential suppliers
to accurately calculate the expected bargaining solution of the interaction. Whereas
repeating players can be assumed to get it right through the ongoing process of trial and
error, such a prospect is unlikely in the case of one-time bidders. In addition, one-time
suppliers may act “irrationally”—that is, enter the negotiations despite a negative
expected value—due to various cognitive biases, such as the well-documented tendency
of over-optimism.128
124

The offers, as a function of the number of candidates who negotiate, are: $150,000 (1 candidate);
$108,333 (2 candidates); $102,777 (3); $101,250 (4); and $100,666 (5).
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If three candidates
$2,777/3 – $1,000= - $74.

make

the

journey,

the

expected

benefit

of

each

would

be
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Based on the figures given in supra note 124, the firm increases its surplus by $108,333-$100,666 =
$7,667. Given the costs of $2,500, the net increase is $5,167.

127

Specifically, over-investment in PCR is expected when the investment generates a relatively little added
value but can affect the competition in a significant number of cases; and under-investment in PCR is
expected when the investment has relatively considerable added value but can effect the competition only
on rare occasions. See supra Part VI.B.2.

128

The first to define this phenomenon was Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life
Events, 39 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 (1980). For legal applications, see, e.g., Eyal Zamir,
The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 270 (1998); C. Jolls, C. Sunstein & R. Thaler, A
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Assuming that not all suppliers are fully rational and fully informed, we refer to two
elements that determine the aggregate level of PCR—the number of suppliers who enter
the negotiations (and thus invest in PCR) and the allocation of transferable PCR.
1. The Number of Bidders
When suppliers are not fully rational or not fully informed, the number of active bidders
may well deviate from that predicted by theoretical models of rational, fully informed
players. The single supplier may either over-estimate or under-estimate potential entry,
and as a result may be either too cautious or too hasty about entering the negotiation.129
Yet in One-Time Players Markets, we have at least two reasons to assume that the
number of suppliers who enter to the negotiations (and invest in PCR) will more often
than not be excessive.
First, if the pool of potential suppliers is large enough, it is sufficient that a
relatively small number of them under-estimate potential entry in order to hamper the
Entry Mechanism and prevent participating suppliers from receiving sufficient
compensation for their PCR. Assume, for example, that the market for fast-food
franchisees in a given area consists of 50 potential candidates, and that the Entry
Mechanism requires that only 3 of them negotiate with the fast-food chain. It is
sufficient that a small percentage of the candidates (8% or more) are too optimistic
about their chances of winning the franchise to distort the Entry Mechanism, and to
cause under-compensation for suppliers’ investment in PCR. Therefore, even if we
assume that, on average, each supplier’s entry estimations are on the mark, the Entry
Mechanism will still be deficient.130
Second, as mentioned above, the purchaser has an interest in encouraging excessive
participation by suppliers in the negotiation process. The purchaser can induce suppliers
to enter the negotiation and to invest in PCR by convincing potential bidders that their
likelihood of success is greater than they perceive. For example, if potential employees
are inexperienced and tend to take optimistic statements by potential employers at face
value, employers might use such "cheap talk" to encourage participation in their
recruitment procedures.
2. Allocation of Transferable PCR
Excessive entry of suppliers means over-investment in PCR. Suppliers will invest in
PCR because of Competition-Based Motivation, even though they will not be
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1524, 1537, 1548 (1998); Ron
Harris & Einat Albin, Bankruptcy Policy in Light of Manipulation in Credit Advertising (forthcoming)
(arguing that credit suppliers tend to utilize and enhance consumers' optimism bias).
129

For some inconclusive empirical evidence that inexperienced players tend to underestimate potential
entry, see Smith and Levin, supra note 117, p. 343 (The more inexperienced a player is, the greater her
inclination to submit a bid even if the net expected value is negative).

130

Of course, some suppliers may take this consideration into account and hence be (rightly) overly
pessimistic. Yet, it seems implausible to assume that such super-rationality is common to all (or most)
suppliers in a One-time Players Market.
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adequately compensated for this investment. Knowing that, the purchaser has
insufficient incentives to invest in transferable PCR and will thus tend to pass the
burden on to suppliers. The misallocation will be similar to the one that we predicted in
Repeating Players Markets, with one important difference: In Repeating Players
Markets, the cost of the misallocation was paid by the purchaser, whereas in One-Time
Players Markets it is paid by the suppliers. The following example demonstrates the
problem:
Example 7: As in Example 6, assume that five law school graduates apply for a
one-year job opportunity with a large firm in Miami. This time, however, assume,
that the candidates are not fully rational or not fully informed. For example,
assume that each of them considers that her probability of getting the job is 50%
higher than her actual prospects.131
In this scenario, each candidate is willing to travel to Miami as long as no more
than three candidates are making the journey. If so, the firm will no longer find it
cost-effective to send its executive to the candidates (because it would generate a
benefit of $2,111 at a cost of $2,500). Suppliers' irrationality or lack of
information induces the purchaser (the firm) to inefficiently pass on transferable
PCR to the suppliers. The outcome is over-investment in PCR by suppliers (the
candidates spend $3,000 on travel expenses instead of the firm spending $2,500);
and each supplier faces an expected net loss of $74 from entering the negotiation
with the firm.
In both the case of rational suppliers and that of irrational ones, the purchaser has an
interest in cutting down his costs by avoiding transferable PCR. In the case of rational,
well-informed suppliers, as analyzed in Example 6, the purchaser has an opposing
interest to shoulder transferable PCR so as to encourage entry of suppliers to the
negotiation. Consequently, the purchaser’s interest in encouraging excessive entry may
induce efficient allocation of transferable PCR (or even overburden the purchaser). By
contrast, in the case of irrational or ill-informed suppliers, as analyzed in Example 7, the
purchaser is not required to incur these excessive costs in order to encourage entry. The
suppliers’ irrationality may induce a sufficient number of bidders. The purchaser may
well be better suited to assess whether the precontractual investment is efficient.
However, inasmuch as the supplier is expected to (over)invest in PCR, to the benefit of
the purchaser, the latter does not have sufficient incentives to internalize the costs of
131

The following table depicts the candidates' objective and subjective prospects, and their objective and
subjective profits from participating in the negotiation:
Candidates
who
negotiate

Objective
prospects of each
candidate

Objective profits
of each candidate

A candidate’s
subjective
prospects

A candidate’s
subjective
profits

1

100%

$50,000

100%

$50,000

2

50%

$4,167

75%

$6,250

3

33.33%

$926

50%

$1,389

4

25%

$312.5

37.5%

$468.75

5

20%

$133.2

30%

$199.8
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PCR—and thus to optimally invest—or to convey the supplier with information
regarding the relevant risk that the parties will not form a contract. The result is not only
inefficiency, but also expected net-loss to the suppliers, who over-invest.
3. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores
The arguments presented above can be illustrated through the aforementioned famous
case of Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores.132 In this case, the plaintiffs, Hoffman, were a
couple who owned and operated a bakery. They contacted the defendant, Red Owl, a
firm that owned and operated a chain of grocery stores, and extended franchises to
individuals. Mr. Hoffman informed the representative of Red Owl that he had $18,000
available for capital to invest in the franchise, and the representative assured him that
such an investment was more than sufficient to open a Red Owl store. During the
negotiations, but before an agreement was reached, the Hoffman couple invested a
considerable amount in PCR. They sold their bakery, bought and sold a grocery store to
gain experience in running that kind of business, and purchased a lot on which to build
their Red Owl store. However, subsequent to these investments, Red Owl officials
informed Mr. Hoffman that the required capital to open a Red Owl franchise was raised,
first to $26,000 and eventually to $34,000. In response, Hoffman broke off negotiations
with Red Owl and sued. The Court ruled in favor of Hoffman, based on the doctrine of
promissory estoppel, and awarded the couple damages equal to their reliance losses—
the irrevocable part of their PCR.133
The conventional reading of Hoffman v. Red Owl in the law and economics
literature is as a prime example of the law’s concern with the danger of underinvestment in PCR due to holdup problems.134 According to this reading, Red Owl tried
to opportunistically raise the capital it required from Hoffman from $18,000 to $34,000,
based on its assessment that the couple would be forced to accept these new terms after
their investment in PCR was already “sunk.” Arguably, anticipating such a prospect,
future Hoffmans would under-invest, and legal intervention must aim to rectify this
inefficiency.135 This analysis raises several difficulties. To begin with, it is not
supported by the facts as described in the judgment. Hoffman’s behavior refutes the
above prediction; they invested in PCR prior to the formation of a binding agreement
and rejected the alleged holdup attempt. Moreover, the Court did not find that Red Owl
has acted in bad faith during the negotiations; there is no allegation in the judgment that
Red Owl’s first statement, requiring $18,000 in capital, was fraudulent, or that its later
demand of $34,000 was unfounded.136 To the contrary, the Court based its decision on
132

133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
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Ibid. For a detailed description of the background of this case and its aftermath, see Stewart Macaulay et
al., Contracts: Law in Action 401 (2d ed. 2003); Duhl, supra note 47, at 299-305.

134

Johnston, supra note 4, pp. 1934-1935 (“economic analysts of contract law came to view Hoffman as
exemplifying the… specter of inefficient under-reliance.”)

135

Bebchuk and Ben-Shahar, supra note 1, p. 404; Katz, supra note 4, p. 1255; Kostritsky, supra note 4, p.
640; Kostritsky, supra note 25, p. 340; Kostritsky, supra note 4, p. 1323.

136

The Court explicitly stated that “there is no evidence that would support a finding that [Owl’s
representative] made any of the promises, upon which plaintiffs' complaint is predicated, in bad faith with
any present intent that they would not be fulfilled by Red Owl”: 133 N.W.2d 267, 273. See also Duhl,
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Red Owl’s “promissory representations,” on which Hoffman relied “in the exercise of
ordinary care.”137 In other words, liability was imposed based on the Red Owl’s
representations that induced excessive PCR by Hoffman and not on abuse of postinvestment superior bargaining power by Red Owl.
In addition, the reading of Hoffman v. Red Owl as dealing with the prospect of
under-investment by future would-be franchisees disregards Competition-Based
Motivation. It is plausible to assume that would-be franchisees such as Hoffman
compete with other potential candidates. In fact, it is quite possible that the Hoffman
couple’s willingness to invest so much time and effort in training themselves was a
result of their understanding that they must put themselves on equal ground with other
contenders. If so, then the mechanism of the market, described above, is sufficient to
induce players in Hoffman position to invest in PCR. Moreover, assuming that these
future franchisees, much like Hoffman, will not be fully rational and informed, the more
probable prospect is of over-investment rather than under-investment in PCR.
For these reasons, we view Hoffman v. Red Owl as demonstrating the problem of
over-investment in PCR that may occur in One-Time Players Markets. Hoffman’s PCR
creates value only if a franchise agreement is formed. The assessment of the efficiency
of this investment must be calculated based on the risk that a contract will not be
reached. It seems that the couple, being inexperienced and naive, were not aware of this
risk, whereas Red Owl, as an experienced repeating player, was (or should have been)
conscious of it. However, Red Owl did not have an incentive to account for this risk
because it did not bear the costs of wasted investment in PCR when the risk
materialized, and due to its expectation that Hoffman would decide to invest in PCR
well above what was needed, given the couple's partial information set.138 In such cases,
the main concern is that the franchiser (Red Owl) encourages would-be franchisees
(Hoffman) to over-invest by shifting transferable PCR (e.g., training costs). Shifting
these costs back to Red Owl, through precontractual liability to reimburse Hoffman, is
aimed at causing Red Owl to internalize the risk of unwarranted investment, and in this
manner motivates it to prevent over-investment in PCR by would-be franchisees such as
Hoffman.139
supra note 47, at 314-320 (The court based its decision on the doctrine of promissory estoppel and not on
the duty to negotiate in good faith). Notwithstanding this reasoning of the court, several scholars argued
that the decision can be read as based on the duty to negotiate in good faith. See, e.g., Summers, supra
note 88, at 223-225.
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133 N.W.2d 267, 274.
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Compare T. M. Scanlon, Promises and Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW (Peter Benson ed.,
Cambridge University Press, 2001) 86, 103 (“Red Owl was required to compensate Hoffman for losses
resulting from actions that they knew he was taking in the expectation, which they knew to be unrealistic,
that he was going to get a Red Owl franchise. …”); Duhl, supra note 47, at 306 (“The court in Red Owl
recognized that franchisors could abuse their bargaining power without risk to themselves and provided a
mechanism in promissory estoppel to induce franchisors to live up to their precontractual assurances and
representations.”).
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Indeed, if the risk of not contracting is low enough, it is possible that the investment in PCR is justified.
Imposing “strict” liability on Red Owl can nevertheless be justified, because it enables savings of
litigation costs by directing behavior through internalization. For a related argument, see Craswell, supra
note 5, at pp. 504-505 (Imposing costs of reliance on Red Owl is justified because it “would induce [it]
either to correct [the franchisee’s] misinformation or to disclaim any commitment entirely.”); Kostritsky,
supra note 4, pp. 1322-23 (arguing that “Hoffman's investment… may well have been inefficient because
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We can thus conclude that in a One-Time Players Market, if the suppliers are not
fully rational or not fully informed, an outcome of excessive entry and thus overinvestment in PCR is expected, to the benefit of the purchaser and at the expense of the
suppliers. In addition, the purchaser also has an interest in imposing the costs of
transferable PCR onto the suppliers because such a strategy does not adequately
discourage entry. The purchaser reaps the fruits of this over-investment in PCR but
externalizes its costs.
C. Policy Implications
We have seen that the purchaser has an interest in encouraging the excessive entry of
suppliers. The purchaser can induce suppliers to enter negotiations and to invest in PCR
in two ways: bearing the suppliers' negotiation costs and convincing potential bidders
that their likelihood of success is greater than they perceive.
The first strategy is relevant mainly when suppliers are fully rational and informed.
Paradoxically, the suppliers' situation is worsened when the purchaser decides to pay for
transferable PCR. Lower costs of the PCR that each supplier bears are associated with a
greater number of suppliers who submit a bid. The increase in the number of bidders
decreases the net expected benefit that each supplier derives from participating in the
negotiations, due to the enhanced competition between the suppliers. Thus, the costs of
PCR are indirectly passed on to the suppliers.140 Nevertheless, it seems that this
unfortunate consequence for suppliers (and, possibly, for efficiency as well) is not
sufficient to justify legal intervention that prevents the purchaser from investing in
transferable PCR. The purchaser's strategy utilizes the competition mechanism in order
to increase his share of the pie. It does not make suppliers' participation in the
bargaining unprofitable, but only reduces the expected value of their participation. Thus,
such a strategy should generally be considered legitimate in a legal system based on the
market mechanism as the primary method of resource allocation.
Thus, in general, a purchaser’s practices of paying for transferable PCR in order to
foster competition between suppliers should be allowed in One-Time Players Markets.
However, such approval should be limited to across-the-board practices, and should not
include polices of selective (or differential) reimbursement (e.g., paying only the third
candidate’s travel expenses in Example 6). The purchaser can experience an advantage
by employing such a strategy. Aiming to induce “indeterminate” suppliers to enter into
negotiations, the purchaser may accordingly prefer to reimburse only those suppliers.
Applying such a strategy inevitably harms those suppliers who are not reimbursed. If
they decide to submit a bid, this decision is presumably based on the assumption that all
the probabilities of a trade were too remote at that point. At the same time, the investment provided
valuable information to the franchisor… and thus had value in screening Hoffman's capabilities.”)
However, these scholars justify imposing liability on Red Owl based on the prospect that, otherwise,
future Hoffmans would under-invest. For instance, Kostritsky argues (ibid, p. 1323) that “if putative
promisors were able opportunistically to exploit the sunk costs of potential franchisees without legal
liability, then the likely effect would be that promisees would invest less in future transactions and
promisors would be deprived of valuable information that would enable them to determine whether to
proceed and on what terms.” We find this prediction debatable.
140

See supra Part VII.A.3.

Page 45 of 49

REGULATING CONTRACT FORMATION

bidders bear their own costs of PCR, and thus on the prospect that a certain number of
bidders will be competing. Reimbursing additional suppliers, which results in inducing
them to join the competition, makes the net expected value of the former bidders
negative. Thus, a strategy of selective (or differential) reimbursement of the suppliers'
costs of negotiation, which is not conveyed to all potential bidders before they decide
whether to invest in PCR, should be forbidden in One-Time Players Markets.
The purchaser’s second strategy—conveying the suppliers with a rosy forecast
regarding each supplier's likelihood of winning the competition—is just as problematic
as selective reimbursement. Such a strategy is likely to induce excessive entry into the
competition, to the purchaser's benefit. Here, again, the enhanced competition is based
on inducing suppliers to submit a bid, even though the actual net expected value of
submitting a bid is negative. As such, this strategy should be considered illegitimate.
Then again, prohibiting the strategy of spreading optimism directly seems to be
very costly, requiring massive regulation of the negotiation process.141 Therefore, it
seems preferable in most cases to handle the consequences of excessive entry rather
than its cause. The main inefficiency of excessive entry in One-Time Players Markets is
over-investment in PCR by the suppliers. This tendency can be met by rules that oblige
the purchaser to perform certain PCR and that prohibit the purchaser from transferring
PCR to the suppliers. One example for such intervention is the application of the
doctrine of promissory estoppel in the case of Hoffman v. Red Owl that was discussed
above. Another example concerns statutes that compel employers to pay for training
periods of potential employees.142 As far as incentives to invest in PCR are concerned,
the employer should be exempted from the duty to reimburse would-be employees for
their investment in training only when it is evident that the trainees were fully aware of
the risk that they may not be hired and could have thus correctly calculated whether
their investment in PCR was justified.143
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Compare Johnston, note 4 supra (highlighting the costs of limiting "cheap talk" by over-regulation of the
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The main channel through which employers could be forced to cover at least part of the training costs of
potential employees is minimum wage statutes, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The
Supreme Court's narrow reading of the FLSA in Walling v. Portland Terminal Co. 330 U.S. 148 (1947)
(railway yard trainees are not “employees” under the FLSA), which to a large extent blocked this channel,
is therefore undesirable according to our analysis. For the current unclear state of the law with respect to
the implementation of the FLSA to trainees, see D. Yamada, The Employment Law Rights of Student
Interns, 35 CONN. L. REV. 215, 224-238 (2002).
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McDonald's Corp. v. Miller 1994 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13243 (Dist. of N.J.) (The Court rejected the claim of a
trainee for wages for his training period that lasted almost a year, based on its finding that the defendant
repeatedly warned the trainee that there was a substantial risk that he would not be hired as a franchisee).
A third example is mandatory disclosure rules that prevent the purchaser from transferring to the
suppliers the burden of collecting and verifying information, such as the requirement from homeowners
to disclose significant defects (e.g., termites) to potential buyers, even when such defects can be
discovered by an appropriate expert examination. Compare Swinton v. Whitinsville Saving Bank, 42 N.E.
2d 808 (Mass., 1942) (not recognizing a duty to disclose termite infestation based on the caveat emptor
rationale) with Quashnock v. Frost, 445 A.2d 121 (Pa., 1982) (recognizing a duty to disclose “dangerous”
defects including termite infestation). Our analysis not only supports the Quashnock approach, but
suggests that it might be wise to go even further, e.g., by finding homeowners liable for not revealing
significant defects even if they did not have actual knowledge about them. However, a full study of the
justification for mandatory disclosure rules is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Note that the justification for legal intervention in these cases derives from the
presumption that the party who is expected to bear the costs of PCR is ill informed, and
is thus expected to over-invest. The cost-shifting rules are aimed at imposing the betterinformed party to internalize these costs, in order to insure optimal investment
decisions. In contrast, if the suppliers are fully rational and informed, the purchaser
must bear the full costs of suppliers’ investment in PCR through the Entry Mechanism.
Hence, the purchaser has sufficient incentive to prevent excessive investment by
suppliers in PCR, making legal intervention unjustified.144
This recommendation establishes unity between the case of Repeating Players
Markets and One-Time Players Markets. In both markets, there is a concern regarding
inefficient shifting of PCR toward the competitive side of the table (the suppliers in our
scenario). The difference lies only in the identity of the party who pays for the
inefficiency (the purchaser in Repeating Players Markets and irrational or ill-informed
suppliers in One-Time Players Markets). Accordingly, mandatory requirements to
invest in transferable PCR (e.g., disclosure requirements) should be imposed on parties
who deal with players operating in competitive markets, regardless of whether these are
repeating players or not, when it can be shown that this is the efficient allocation of
these costs.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Like any social institution, the process of contract formation undergoes constant change.
Indeed, “Gone are the days when our ancestors sat around a fire and bargained for the
exchange of stone axes for bear hides. Today the stakes are much higher and
negotiations are much more complex.”145 Yet, amidst the fundamental changes, we must
remain conscious of realities that remain the same. Negotiating parties want to reach an
agreement, and they want to gain the most from that agreement. Those two ambitions
are, always had been, and always will be, somewhat contradictory. In order to secure a
deal, one might be required to act in a way that reduces one's share of the profits from
contracting. The simplest way to read this paper is as a reminder of this perpetual truth.
Negotiating parties will be willing to invest in PCR that does not increase the profits
they would receive from contracting, if the PCR raises their prospects of consummating
the deal.
A deeper way to understand our contribution is as an informed attempt to give
competition its proper role within the legal deliberation about contract theory. The
decision when to form a contract is based on the following tradeoff: In the precontractual period, competition between potential suppliers over the supplier’s surplus
motivates them to invest in PCR, to the benefit of the purchaser. However, the
duplication of investments by the potential suppliers is wasteful. By contrast, forming
the contract is aimed at limiting the expenditures on performance to only one supplier,
who receives in return the legal entitlement to the supplier’s surplus. Yet, in the postcontractual period, lack of competition between suppliers may create insufficient
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Indeed, the Courts tend to reject suits that are based on Hoffman v. Red Owl where sophisticated
suppliers are concerned. See supra note 82 and the accompanying text.
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motivation for the winning supplier to invest in the relationships (this trade-off is by noway limited to commercial setting. Marriage can serve as another example).146 The
optimal time of contracting is thus determined based on the comparison between
competition-based scheme and entitlement-based one.147
The grand question is who should have the discretion to switch from one legal
regime to the next: each individual negotiator for herself or a social planner for both of
them. Classical legal thought was strongly influenced by the concept of laissez-faire,
which placed overwhelming weight on the constructive function of competition to keep
freedom of contract in accord with social welfare. Therefore, it is not surprising that the
reaction against the classical conception of private law included, as an integral part, an
attack on the concept of competitive markets, and a strong emphasis on the ubiquity of
market failures such as holdup problems.148 Yet, the forces of competition—i.e., its
ability to influence decisions and actions - cannot be ignored. The “invisible hand” of
competition may not always lead to the right place, but it is always pushing in some
direction. Hence, the assessment of the expected behavior of negotiating parties, and
thus of the proper regulation of the negotiation process, must account for the
characteristics of the competition they face.
We demonstrated the importance of accounting for competition by focusing on two
types of “relatively” competitive markets—the Repeating Players Market and One-Time
Players Market.149 The fundamental result of our analysis is that when a negotiating
party (“the supplier”) operates in a relatively competitive environment, she is generally
motivated to make precontractual investments that increase the contractual pie,
notwithstanding the prospect that the competition she faces will enable the other party
(“the purchaser”) to extract the benefits generated by her investment. In a relatively
competitive market, the equilibrium price includes a factor that compensates the
suppliers for the “sunk,” precontractual investments. This prediction, in conjunction
with the effect of the investment on a supplier’s chances of winning the contract, lead to
the conclusion that, as a general rule, suppliers are sufficiently motivated to invest in
PCR. As a result, when a party operates in a relatively competitive environment, the
concern of under-investment in PCR seems unfounded, and so does the argument in
support of legal intervention that is aimed at encouraging PCR.
The analysis thus accentuates the important role of competition in directing the
parties’ investments during the negotiation phase. However, the discussion does not
yield an unrestricted support of laissez-faire policy, of avoiding regulating the
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bargaining process. Our account of market competition shows that efficiency
considerations justify legal intervention aimed mainly at preventing over-investment in
PCR. Specifically, we argue that legal intervention is required to deter the purchaser
from illegitimately exploiting the competition between the suppliers (e.g., by preventing
him from manipulating a bidder’s assessment of her likelihood of success in winning
the contract). Legal intervention is also required to achieve optimal allocation of
transferable PCR, by imposing costs on the purchaser whenever he is the efficient cost
bearer. In addition, we have seen that when the suppliers operate in a competitive
market of “professional” repeating players, the purchaser bears the costs of suppliers’
PCR and thus internalizes the costs of increasing the number of suppliers with whom he
negotiates. As a result, efficiency considerations do not justify restricting the
purchaser’s discretion in setting the number of bidders. By contrast, when suppliers
operate in a competitive market of one-time players, the purchaser externalizes the costs
of increasing the number of bidders, and may thus encourage excessive entry of
suppliers to the negotiations. In such a case, legal intervention aimed at regulating the
purchaser’s behavior can thus be justified.
Finally, at the deepest level, our project demonstrates the importance of accounting
for the relevant market's structure in economic analysis of contract law. Economic
analysis of contract law typically concentrates on the incentive structure that the
contractual regime creates—i.e., on the motivations of negotiators or contracting parties
given their respective relationship. We believe that such a view is too narrow.
Contracting parties’ incentives cannot be derived solely from their mutual rights and
obligations. Accounting for the market structure is a necessary component in any true
and comprehensive understanding of contractual practices and the effects of their
regulation.150
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